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In Europe and in Britain between 1918-1922, Great
Britain and its Prime Minister David Lloyd George greatly
i~luenced the political and diplomatic occurrences.

In

the latter part of 1918, during the National Election campaign, Lloyd George appeared to have committed Britain to
the pursuit of a vindictive peace settlement at the forthcoming Paris Peace Co~erence.

Earlier, on January 5, 1918,

Lloyd George's war aims speech had set a tone of moderation,
That sense of moderation was now betrayed by these vindictive election pledges,

Therefore, it is widely believed

that the election pledges so hampered the British peace
delegation that it was virtually impossible to create a just
and lasting peace settlement for Germany and Europe,

The

election appeared to have placed a dark cloud over the
liberal- sounding peace program that Lloyd George had outlined before the armistice.

The number of positions open

to Lloyd George at the conference were probably diminished,
but he managed to out-maneuver most of his political
opponents and conduct his own moderate style of peacemaking.
There are still many questions that remain regarding Lloyd George's peace policies and also regarding the
impact of the election on British peace diplomacy and on
Lloyd George's ability to conduct his own particular style
of conference diplomacy from 1919-1922.

While the election

apparently committed the British to a harsh peace, Lloyd
George and the British delegation sought a relatively
moderate settlement.

There were, of course, practical

limits to what any nation could expect to accomplish at
Paris.

The Paris Peace Conference would satisfy few people,

but Lloyd George was confident that peace in Europe could
somehow be realized.

He believed that by keeping the

European powers at the conference table progress could be
achieved.

Lloyd George felt that if diplomats were talking,

progress would ultimately be made in shaping a working and
lasting peace.
British Conference diplomacy, which seemed to be
very generous to Germany, was at odds with a more aggressive
French policy which was apparently determined to keep Germany weak and to make her comply with all the terms of the
Versailles Treaty.

However, it is not intended that this

study be an analysis of the failure of the Treaty of

Versailles and the interested powers to maintain peace
after 1919,

Rather, it will be an effort to study the

policies stated in the Election of 1918 and the more moderate and consistent policies actually pursued during the
balance of Lloyd George's tenure as Prime Minister.
Information and data for the thesis were gathered
from various sourcebooks,

Primary sources were used such

as British Foreign Policy Documents, British Cabinet
Minutes, U.S. State Department Documents and various other
public documents.

Document collections of the Paris Peace

Conference and other conferences held between 1919 and 1922
were also relied upon,

Secondary sources were also used

such as memoirs, diaries, letters, topical monographs,
autobiographies and biographies, newspaper and journal
articles.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In Europe and in Britain between 1918-1922,
Great Britain and its Prime Minister David Lloyd George
greatly inf'luenced the political and diplomatic
occurrences.

In the latter part of 1918, during the

National Election campaign, Lloyd George appeared to have
committed Britain to the pursuit of a vindictive peace
settlement at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference.
Earlier, on January 5, 1918, Lloyd George's war aims
speech had set a tone for moderation.

That sense of

moderation was noij;.'betrayed by these vindictive election
pledges.

Therefpre, it is widely believed that the

election pledges so hampered the British peace delegation
that it was virtually impossible to create a just and
lasting peace settlement for Germany and Europe.

The

election appeared to have placed a dark cloud over the
liberal-sounding peace program that Lloyd George had
outlined before the armistice.

The number of positions

open to Lloyd George at the conference were probably
diminished, but he managed to out-maneuver most of his
political opponents and conduct his own moderate style of
peacemaking.
1
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There are still many questions that remain regarding Lloyd George's peace policies and also regarding
the impact of the election on British peace diplomacy
and on Lloyd George's ability to conduct his own particular style of conference diplomacy from 1919-1922.

While

the election apparently committed the British to a harsh
peace, Lloyd George and the British delegation sought a
relatively moderate settlement.

There were, of course,

practical limits to what any nation could expect to accomplish at Paris.

The Paris Peace Conference would satisfy

few people, but Lloyd George was confident that peace in
Europe could somehow be realized.

He believed that by

keeping the European powers at the conference table progress could be achieved.

Lloyd George felt that if

diplomats were talking, progress would ultimately be made
in shaping a working and lasting peace.
British Conference diplomacy, which seemed to be
very generous to Germany, was at odds with a more aggressive French policy which was apparently determined to keep
Germany weak and to make her comply with all the terms of
the Versailles Treaty.

However, it is not intended that

this study be an analysis of the failure of the Treaty of
Versailles and the interested powers to maintain peace after

1919-

Rather, it will be an effort to study the policies

stated in the Election of 1918 and the more moderate and

J

consistent policies actually pursued during the balance of
Lloyd George's tenure as Prime Minister.

Chapter 2
PLANS FOR PEACE
The primary concern of this chapter is the formulation of Lloyd George's war aims and peace plan, as well
as a study of his ability to maintain a consistent policy
of moderation.

During Lloyd George's years as Prime

Minister, 1916-1922, he had to deal with two basic and
important problems;

the problems were that of waging war

and then making and maintaining peace.
When ~loyd George became Prime Minister in 1916,
Britain was intent on stopping the German drive for
mastery of Europe
lands.

and the restoration of Belgian and French

At this point in the war the resumption of the

Somme offensive on the western front had occurred;

there

had been an attack on Bulgaria in the east and virtually
no action at all in any of the secondary theatres of war. 1
There was actually no one who had enumerated point by point
a peace program. 2 When Lloyd George finally did announce
Britain's terms, he was persuaded to do so by a number of
1Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (Barrie and Jenkins,
Ltd., 1975), pp.J82-J8J.

4

5

forces, all ultimately requiring him to make an official
pronouncement of war aims.

The general principles for

peace and the future of Europe were made public in January
of 1918.
Lloyd George never aspired to be a Wilsonian
idealist in his peacemaking.
realist for that.

He was too much a political

He did believe that there might be a

great and peaceful Europe someday, but this had to be
achieved in a gradual manner.

Most of all, he wanted eco-

nomic recovery at home and abroad and he wished to avoid a
return to the pre-1914 era of diplomacy through alliance
and intimidation.

On this matter France was his most for-

midable opponent at the end of the war.
Before Lloyd George became Prime Minister, he was
dedicated to a vigorous prosecution of the war effort,
advocating "the knock-out blow in the belief that as Secretary of War, he was about to deliver it. 3
On September 28, -1916, Lloyd George said that
Britain and France were fighting to end the German menace,
to peace and that any peace efforts at the moment would be
premature.

In his war memoirs he says, "the motto of the

Allies was 'Never Again!'.

I was myself fresh from a visit

to the battlefields, and the ghastliness I had witnessed was

York:

JA.J.P. Taylor, English History 1g14-1945 (New
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 2.
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something which must never be reenacted.
that certain . ., 4

The war must make

According to A, J.P. Taylor, Lloyd George's
attempt at the "knock-out blow" was done in order to silence in advance President Wilson's proposal for a
negotiated peace. 5

At this point in time, Lloyd George

believed that the war was nearing its end with an Allied
victory.

The Cabinet minutes for Lloyd George's first month

as Prime Minister indicate that there was considerable reluctance to take up any of the Wilsonian peace proposals
circulated in 1916.

It would seem that the general feeling

in the cabinet was for President of the United States
Woodrow Wilson not to "butt in" . 6 The feeling against
peace, however, was not unanimous.

On November 13, 1916,

Lord Lansdowne, who advocated moderate war aims, circulated
a memorandum, "Respecting Peace Settlement". 7
In 1916 Lloyd George was still not convinced of
the need to initiate peace talks.

There were no unusual

4Frank Owen, Tern estuous Journe
His Life and Times (New York: McGraw-Hill

e

5A.J.P. Taylor, English History, pp.62-63.
6Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George,
1914-1918, VI (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1957), II,
p.280.
7Lloyd George, War Memoirs, II,

pp. 288-296.
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pressures on Britain at that time, such as the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917,

But offers to talk about peace were

not rejected outright.

With regard to the German peace

offer on December 15, 1916, the Cabinet did not want to
brush the offer aside, but neither did it wish to call an
Allied peace conference.

The Cabinet felt that a con-

ference might give the impression that the Allies were
looking at the question in detail- and were considering
counter-proposals;

this might raise false hopes.

And when

it was known that "the conference had only met to dismiss
the proposals, or to invite the Germans to make further
8
proposals," there would be an unfavorable reaction.
Regarding peace talks in 1916, Lord Robert Cecil said that
a refusal of the Cabinet to respond to terms "might induce ... the pacifists to say there is no hope for peace
under the existing leadership." 9 The small but vocal number of pacifists in Britain would have been greatly
encouraged to know the Cabinet was careful not to anger them.
The Allies were unable to attain a military
victory in 1917, so the war continued to drag on with all
involved feeling the terrible toll of the war.

However,

there were two events of major importance that occurred in
8 Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet
Office, Minutes of the Cabinet, CAB 23/1, WC 10, December
18, 1916. (Cabinet papers will be referred to hereafter as
CAB).
9cAB 23/1, WC 16, December 23, 1916.
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the entry of the United States and the utter

collapse of Russia.

America's entry into the war, just as

Russia was beginning to "totter" out of it, was a consolation but it would be many months before she could make
herself felt. 10 At this time the pacifists and. Union of
the Democratic Control only increased their pressure on the
government to make a formal presentation of war aims.
So by the end of 1917 Lloyd George was convinced
that a formal presentation of Britain's war aims was absolutely necessary.
causes:

He was persuaded by a whole host of

the successive failure of Allied offenses in 1915,

1916, 1917, and the recent disaster of the Nivelle offensive;
the withdrawal of labor support of Lloyd George;

failure of

peace conversations with Count Mensdorff of Austria; the
Lansdowne letter urging moderate war aims; and by his cabinet which was very much in favor of an official presentation
of war aims and peace.
The year 1917 had been a turning point for Lloyd
George.

The year before he was thorougly convinced that a

knock- out blow would soon be delivered;

now he was thor-

oughly disillusioned with the way the war was being conducted
and fought by the Generals.

C.P.Scott recorded Lloyd

George's outlook on the war and peace in December of 1917,
Scott felt that Lloyd George wanted his own way in matters
10Peter Rowland, Lloyd George,

p. 401,

9
concerning war policy.

For example, Lloyd George wanted

to stop lifelosing attacks on the west and use only heavy
counter-strokes;

while standing on the defensive "Lloyd
George is taking a more moderate attitude ..... 11 Lloyd
George also reported that "there is a good deal of feeling
in the War Cabinet toward peace. "12 In July the Cabinet

agreed to "postpone the discussion of war aims as long as
possible," 1 3 but by December the feeling of the War Cabinet
distinctly changed.

The Bolshevik Revolution came as a

timely reminder of the costs of military exhaustion and
defeat under conditions of mounting political tensions.
Otherwise Britain might possibly have attempted to hold out
for unconditional surrender.

Had it not been for the

effects of the Bolshevik Revolution, Britain might not have
considered the war aims and peace plans as an acceptable
basis for armistice negotiations at this time. On January
1, 1918, Thomas Jones found the Cabinet atmosphere completely changed.
peace,"

He said that "everybody was talking of

He said "the line now is to publish a declara-

tion on war aims as a counter-offensive to the offer of the
11 Trevor Wilson, ed., The Political Diaries of
C.P.Scott, 1911-1928 (Ithica, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1970), pp. 323-324.
12 Trevor Wilson, Diaries of C.P. Scott, p.325.
13 cAB 23/3, WC 187(19), July 16, 1917,

10

Central Powers to the Bolsheviks (Brest-Litovsk)." 14
There was not complete agreement in the War Cabinet for a
categorical statement of war aims.

Arthur Balfour, first

Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to his colleague Lord Robert
Cecil, Minister of the Blockade, that talk continued about
defining war aims and that this is "a problem in which I
take no very great interest, because, as it seems to one,
there is not the slightest difficulty in defining what ends
we want to attain by the war."

He felt the problem was in

how far the Allies would be willing to go to attain their
ends . 15
The traditional interpretation of British War
Aims is that they were prepared in response to growing domestic pacifist and labor opposition to the war and to the
Brest-Litovsk peace pffer of the Bolsheviks.
pre~ation is only partially correct.

This inter-

Recently opened

documents give far more credit to Lloyd George and his War
16
Cabinet.
It is now evident that Lloyd George's government had been giving consideration to defining war aims, as
well as giving considered thought to a compromise peace
14
Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, 1916-1925, ed.
Keith Middlemas, I, (London1 Oxford University Press, 1969),
p. 42.
1 5Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.19-54.
16
David R.Woodward, "The Origins and Intent of
David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims· Speech", The Historian, 34 (November, 1971), pp.22-39,
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settlement, before the mounting demands for a definition
of war aims reached a peak in late 1917,

He was first of

all disappointed over realization that a "knock-out blow"
was not possible and he maintained a constant fascination
with the possibility of "detaching Austria" from the
Central Powers. 1 7
A number of interesting points of British policy
emerge during the discussion and preparation of war aims.
Lloyd George was willing to undertake rather drastic measures

such as sacrificing Britain's ally Russia to Ger-

many if necessary, but he was "unwilling to seek peace at any
price." 18 Lloyd George did not believe it good policy to
"If we were to beat Germany to nothingness, then we must beat Europe to nothingness, too," 19
destroy Germany

Although this statement was made by General Smuts of the
Union of South Africa, it is mentioned because of Smut's
very great influence over Lloyd George as a constant moderating force in the Cabinet and later at the Paris Peace Conference.

The moderate idea that Germany should not be

destroyed was in evidence at the Paris Peace Conference in
17Harold Nicolson, King George V: His Life and
Reign (London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1967), pp.409-415.
18 navid R,Woodward, "The Origins and Intent",
p. 25,
19cAB 2J/14, WC 491, October 26, 1918,
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March 1919, when he said of Germany and reparations, "We
20
cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay."
This, therefore, is the basic idea of Lloyd
George's diplomacy, 1918-1922.

Throughout the preparation

of war aims, the Cabinet and other political leaders were
consulted and kept abreast of their development. 21 Lloyd
George implied, although he did not always do so, that he
would consult with the Opposition leaders, with the leaders
of Labour and with the representatives of the Dominions,
such as were available. 22 This was to be the first major
definition of war aims by the government and the world
would be watching.
There were four men primarily responsible for the
final drafting of war aims:

Lloyd George, General Smuts,

Philip Kerr, a member of Lloyd George's personal Secretariat, and Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary to the War
Committee.

Meanwhile,thecCabinet continued its discussion

of war aims and the most effective manner to present them.
The Cabinet felt that the declaration of war aims should
show Britain and the Allies, Austria, Turkey and Germany,
20 w.K. Hancock, Smuts: The San uine Years 18 01.21-2. (London: Cambridge University Press, 19 1 , I, pp,
~510.
21 Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control
in British Politics Durin the First World War (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971 , p. 19
22
CAB 23/5, WC 314, January 4, 1918,
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that Britain would go to "the extreme limit of concessions"
and that "our object was not to destroy the enemy nations•:2 3
Lloyd George believed it was essential to convince the nation
that Britain was not continuing the war merely to gain a
vindictive or looting truimph, but that Britain had definite
peace aims and that these were both just and attainable, 24
Lloyd George also accepted a Cabinet suggestion that he
state Britain's war aims before the Trade Unionists who were
currently meeting in London.
The decision to go before the Trade Unionists
has been given significance as a concession to the mounting
pressure from Labor and the Union of Democratic Control,
But Lloyd George was not going before them with the intention
of bending to their demands,

The Cabinet minutes reveal

that the decision was based entirely upon "convenience,"
since Parliament was not currently meeting and the Trade
Unionists would surely raise the war aims issue.

The Cabi-

net felt that the appropriate place for Lloyd George to make
his statement would be the House of Commons, but since the
House of Commons was not in session, the meeting of the
Trades Unionists afforded the most convenient opportunity
and it would be advisable and desirable to take advantage of
it.

"It was suggested, and generally admitted, that there
23 CAB 23/5, WC 312, January 3, 1918,
24Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, p.38.

would be some adverse criticism to a statement made by
the Trades Unionists" because it would give them exaggerated
importance over other sections of the community. 25 The
government secured labor approval for the war aims statement
and therefore, Lloyd George delivered his moderate war aims
address of 5 January 1918 "not to Parliament but to a
Trades Union conference at Claxton Hall in London," 26
According to Arno Mayer's study of Lloyd George's
speech on war aims, the decision to make a presentation
rested on three points:

domestic pressures, foreign de-

mands, and Lloyd George's change of mind.

"The British

Premier presently considered the utility and substance of
a major diplomatic pronouncement,"

The "converging polit-

ical pressures" from the United States and Russia "were
also not unrelated to the ominous military statement." 27
The presentation of the war aims speech was wellreceived and Lloyd George was confident that he had, for
the moment, taken the wind out of the sails of the "peaceat-any-price" brigade,

Three days later, President Wilson

put forward his Fourteen Points as the basis of a peace
settlement.

The second point, in particular, "Freedom of

25 CAB 23/5, WC 312, January 3, 1918,
26Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control,
p, 198.
27 Arno Mayer, Wilson Vs.Lenin,

P, 313,
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the Seas," was quite unacceptable to Britain and would
obviously have to be argued about at a later date. 28
Lloyd George's speech was not so unreservedly
idealistic as it appeared on the surface.

The German

colonies were to be disposed of on "the general principle
of self-determination"
be returned to Germany.

in other words, they would not
Again, though "national" Turkey

was respected, the Straits were to be "internationalised
and neutralised," and "Arabia, Armenia, Syria and Palestine
are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate conditions"

meaning that they were to be largely

partitioned between England and France.

The recognition of

Austria-Hungary was largely tactical, due to the fact that
negotiations were still going on for a compromise peace.
So Lloyd George had other aims beyond satisfying Labour.
His speech was in part an answer to the Bolshevik program
of no annexations and indemnities. 29
The Times of London heralded the speech as "an
impressive proof of unity."JO

The article stated that the

war aims speech was "a carefully-weighed and exactly-phrased
state paper of national character and world-wide appeal."
It was a speech which not only was a statement of govern28 Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, pp.1+28-1+29.
29 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, pp.50-111+.
JOLloyd George, War Memoirs, V,

pp.6J-7J,
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ment policy, but also of national scope.3 1

No where in the

Times' reports of Lloyd George's speech is there talk of
coercion by "special interests." 32 The Times went on to
report that the Prime Minister had also made his reply to
the-· "enemy and to the Bolsheviks."

Lloyd George had given

his speech with a strong turn of moderation, but at the
same time, he outlined the peace conditions that would be
the "irreducible minimum of the Allied terms ..... 33

Lastly,

the Times reported the speech as having been delivered
with a "moderation that may disconcert some tried friends
of the Allies ... 34
Virtually every point of Lloyd George's war aim
speech paralleled Wilson's Fourteen Points, with the exception of the freedom of the seas.

The last paragraphs of

his speech carry the basic principles upon which Lloyd
George would seek peace:
If, then, we are asked what are we fighting for,
we reply, as we have often replied: We are fighting
for a just and a lasting peace, and we believe that
before permanent peace can be hoped for three conditions must be fulfilled.
31 Lloyd George, War
32 A,J,P.Taylor, The
Over Foreign Policy 1792-1939
versity.Press, 1958), p,151,
33L10yd George, War

Memoirs, V,

pp.63-73.

Troublemakers: Dissent
(Bloomington: Indiana UniMemoirs, V,

p;p. 63-73,

34Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V,

pp.63-73,
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First, the sanctity of treaties must be reestablished; secondly, a territorial settlement must be
secured based on the right of self-determination of
the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek
by the creation of some international organization to ·
limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. In these conditions the British Empire
would welcome peace; to secure those conditions its
peoples are prepared to make even §reater sacrifices
than those they have yet endured. 3
Although Lloyd George's moderate war aims speech
was well-received both at home and abroad, its effect on the
Germans and Austrims was disheartening.

On January 24, the
Reichstag turned down Lloyd George and Wilson's plan. 36
But Lloyd George was undaunted by the fai_lure of his war
aims speech to attract interest from the Central Powers.
According to David Woodward, "Lloyd George's
actions during this perilous period of the war denote considerable indecision and experimentation.
permanent peace plan." 37

He clearly had·no

However, Lloyd George did have a

set of definite points upon which to build a peace and he
was always searching to find the right answer to a question.
The war aims principles were a bold act,

the first major

definition of war aims by one of the Allied powers.

There

is no real evidence that points to "indecision" on the part
of Lloyd George.

Throughout the development of the war aims,

35Lloyd George, War Memoirs,

v,

p.73.

36Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.44-47,
37David R.Woodward, "Origins and Intent", p,39.
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Lloyd George projected a policy of moderation and flexibility
which

he believed to be successful.

He was very willing to

consider a negotiated peace.
During the months between Lloyd George's War Aims
speech given on January 5, and October 4, 1918, when the
German government appealed to President Wilson for armistice
terms and the opening of peace negotiation, nothing new was
added to the peace policy by Britain or the other Allied
countries.

To the German note of October 4, "Wilson replied

on the basis of his Fourteen Points and for nearly three
weeks negotiated directly and with considerable inconsistency.

During this period his allies were hard put to discover the policy to which they were pledged."3 8
The Cabinet held an animated and somewhat confused
meeting on October 15 discussing Wilson's second note to
Germany.

Discussion jumped from Poland, to Russia, to

Turkey, to Clemenceau, and to the League of Nations.

The

Cabinet decided that it would be in its best interest for
Wilson to continue his conversations with Germany.

And

Lloyd George defended the securing of a military armistice
by saying that "it was not sufficient for Germany to express
readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points
unless we were in a position to insist on her accepting

3 8 Thomas Jones, Whitehall, editor's note, p.67.

19
the, .. sacred text, .,3 9

This was in keeping with Lloyd

George's previous commitments.

Once Europe was freed from

the domination of German militarism, one could talk about a
lasting peace in Europe,
Lloyd George was determined to conclude the war
with an Allied victory,

"Germany should be beaten,"

He

believed Britain must continue until she could "dictate
.
40
terms " and be a b le to create ", .. a League of Nations,"

But he did not seek a vindictive peace settlement.
Thus, the stage was set for the upcoming General
Election of 1918,

39W,K.Hancock, Smuts, I,

p. 4 93,

40 cAB 23, WC 459, August 15, 1918,

Chapter J
GENERAL ELECTION OF 1918
The Allied and Associated powers adopted a peace
policy on November 4, 1918, during a meeting of the Supreme
War Council at Versailles.

These powers offered peace with

Germany on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses and were careful to note the following1
"They (Allied and Associated powers] must reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the
Peace Conference," and they also must require that compensation would be made "for all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and their property by the
aggression of Germany ... " 1 These reservations were accepted
by Wilson and the Germans informed of the modifications on
November 5, 1918,

Lloyd George, Prime Minister 1916-1922,

reported to the Cabinet that after having studied all of
President Wilson's peace addresses "he could not find a
single point which he wanted that was not amply covered,
with the exception of the points regarding the freedom of
the seas and indemnities, and our position in regard to
these matters had been duly given." 2
1 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, VI, pp.28J-284.
2
CAB 23, WC 497, November 5, 1918.
20

21

Therefore, in early November it looked as if
Lloyd George had set out to fulfill two basic aims:

the

defeat of the German militarism and a just and moderate
settlement built on

Wilsonian principles.

But by mid-

December, after a resounding general election victory won
by Lloyd George and his coalition, it appeared that Lloyd
George had given into a mass hysteria demanding "hang the
Kaiser."

As to the "hanging of the Kaiser", Lloyd George

contends that he never used the phrase.

Lloyd George said1

The Kaiser must be prosecuted. The war was a
crime ... The war was a hideous abominable crime ...
Is no one responsible? ... The men responsible for this
outrage on the human race must not be let off because
their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the
deed,3
Lloyd George's conduct during the election raised
serious doubts as to Lloyd George's ability to maintain a
consistent policy of moderation.

It seems that the type of

settlement the British wanted remained essentially vague
and fluctuated constantly. Harold Nicolson found it
"unfortunate that a British Liberal should have placed himself at the mercy of a jingo Commons and a jingo Press. 4
At this point in time, it looks as if Lloyd George possibly
had more fundamental problems to worry about than the
election pledges.

He had lost the support of the Liberals

3David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I (New Haven: Yale University Press,. 1939), p.109,
4
sir Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York:
Gosset and Dunlop, 1965), p. 20,
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and later became dependent upon the Conservatives ~o sustain him in office.
Lloy,d George and the "Khaki Election" have often
been held responsible for preventing Britain from securing
a just peace and also responsible for tarnishing the entire
atmosphere of the Paris Peace Conference,

Lloyd George had

committed himself to a rigorous peace, but always with
qualifications of moderation.
In the summer of 1918, there were several compelling
reasons for an early general elections

The House of

Commons did not represent current political circumstances;
it had been elected in 1910 and was extended three years
beyond its five-year term because of the War.

Also, as a

limited franchise, women had been given the right to vote
in 1918 and this was a good opportunity for them to exercise this new power.

Furthermore, the late summer advance

of the Allies on the Western front seemed to some individuals,
but not all, an end of war and, likewise, a safe opportunity
to resume party controversy.

Most important, the improving

military situation enabled the Coalition Government to
appeal to the people as the Government that had won the
war. 5

5Robert E.Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War 1914-

1.21.2. (Hamden, Connecticut:
p. 121.

The Shoe String Press, 1975),

2J

In July, 1918, Coalition Conservatives and
Liberals began to make private preparations for an elec.
6 King George V met with Lloyd George on November 5,
t ion.
1918, and Lloyd George informed him that he would be asking
for a dissolution in the near future.

The King finally

agreed to a "dissolution of Parliament at an early date. ".7
The next day Lloyd George announced this decision to the
Liberal members of the Government.

On November 12, Lloyd

George and Unionist Party leader Bonar Law won the consent
of their respective followers to an election. They had
agreed early in November to conduct a Coalition election
as soon as military conditions made it possible "to return
candidates who undertake to support the present government
not only to prosecute the war to its final end and negotiate the peace, but also to deal with the problems of
reconstruction which must immediately arise as an armistice
is signed. ,, 3
Lloyd George was seeking an election mandate to
go to Paris to make peace and yet, ironically, his original
pledges and commitments to the Unionists contained no men-

6Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party
1914-1935 (London, Collins, Fontana Library, 1968), p.141.
7sir Harold Nicolson, King George V, pp.428-429,
8Arno J.Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles
1918-1919 (New York1 A.A.Knopf, 1967), p,137,
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tion of foreign. policy.

He had made commitments to the

Conservatives on Irish Home Rule, Imperial preference, and
even promised to reconsider aspects of the Welsh Church
Act.

Lloyd George lacked the necessary political machine

to conduct an election as a Lloyd George Liberal.

He found

the choice was either to compromise liberal principles and
accept the support of the Conservatives (Unionists) or go
and it seems he preferred to manage a coali-

it alone

tion government.

Lloyd George was, indeed, as widely

popular as a Prime Minister had ever been, but only about
100 of the 260 Liberal MPs in Parliament supported him.
The Conservatives, on the other hand, were a highly organized political party and held 282 seats in the Commons,
but no Conservative approached having the same electoral
appeal of Lloyd George. 10 In these circumstances, coalition made sense.

But in the long run, it turned out to be

the Coalition alliance which caused Lloyd George to step
down in 1922.
Public designation of Coalition candidates had to
be taken care of.

This was especially necessary because of

the confusing party situation in November 1918,

For

example, each of the three major parties contained both
supporters of the Coalition and an independent wing. There
were 81 Independent Conservative candidates in the 1918
10Robert E.Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War, p,122.
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election, but they were independent only in the sense that
they did not have formal 0oalition approval of their campaigns.

Thirty-six of the 81 were candidates in Ulster,

where Coalition leaders thought approval was neither
desirable or necessary.

Most of the remainder were candi-

dates of local Conservative associations which refused to
stand aside for a Coalition Liberal.

Almost all of the

normally independent Conservative candidates supported
Coalition programs and those elected voted with the Government in the New House of Commons. 11 In these conditions,
Coalition leaders were naturally anxious to indicate
publicly who were and who were not their supporters.
The Coalition chose to do this by sending brief
public letters of support to candidates they approved,
These letters were compared to ration coupons by Coalition
opponents;

hence the Coupon Election of 1918,

The deri-

sive name was in answer to Lloyd George's claim that
coupons were sent to men who had patriotically supported
the Government during the War and denied to those who had
not.

This "coupon" was given to 364 Conservatives, 159

Liberals and 18 candidates of the National Democratic Party.
The election was a very strong victory for the Coalition and
the end of hope for a powerful independent Liberal party.

11 John McEwen, "The Coupon Election of 1918 and
Unionist Members of Parliament," Journal of Modern History,
34 (September, 1962), p. 295.

26

The "coupon" was quite effective.
candidates, 478 were returned,

Of the 541 "couponed"

Independent Liberals 27;

Coalition Liberals 138; Conservatives 335; the balance of
the Coalition were National Democratic Party members,
Lloyd George's political maneuvering was part of an overall strategic plan to ensure his political survival. It
changed his situation only by defining it more clearly,
Thus, the main purpose of the coupon arrangement was to
make permanent the existing political state of affairs.
From the start his premiership had depended principally on
the Conservatives, and his electoral bargain showed that he
intended to remain in office by their support, even if this
meant open hostility to the Liberal party.
true of his behaviour during the campaign. 12

The same was
Therefore,

political pragmatism and opportunism secured his election,
but made him entirely dependent upon the Conservatives,
War Committee Member Leo S,Amery observed that
"Lloyd George had a natural instinct for strategy "during
the World War;

therefore, Amery must have also agreed that
Lloyd George possessed the same ability in politics. 1 3 The
manner in which Lloyd George conducted his campaign,
delivering speeches to fit the character and mood of the
12 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall, pp,159-160.
13L.S.Amery, War and Peace 1914-1929, Vol.II,
My Political Life (Landoni Hutchinson, 1953), p.96.
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individual crowds, proved him also to be a master of tactics as well.
The election itself seemed rather listless with
only 57,6 per cent of the electorate in contested divisions
voting. 14 This was the lowest turnout in twentieth-century
British history. There are a number of explanations about
this apathy:

war weariness combined with a psychological

let down about National affairs after the Armistice;

the

large number of soldiers and war industry workers who were
discouraged by the nuisance of absentee voting; confusion
produced by the unusual number and variety of candidates;
the inefficiency of the new electoral registers;

and the

rampant influenza virus which was blanketing Britain, to
name a few.

Another important reason for the apathy was

the obvious fact that there was to be no close contest
between the Coalition and its opponents. 1 5
The absence of drama had two effects on the way
the campaign was to be carried out:

First, it opened the

door to emotional issues that had a seemingly non-partisan,
patriotic appeal, such as those of the anti-German temper.
Thus, Christopher Addison, one of Lloyd George's

14
charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars
1918-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955),

PP· 6-7,

15s~eeches of November 13 and December 7; The
Times (London), November 14, 1918, p,7, and Morning Post
(London), December 9, 1918, p,9,
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former right-hand men at the Ministry of Munitions, who
found his district apathetic, also told a reporter he was
"struck" by his constituents' determination to try the
ex-Kaiser and expel German aliens from Britain. 16 Second,
the absence of a close contest encouraged the press and
electors to focus their attention on the governing party
and especially on the Prime Minister Lloyd George.
Lloyd George's election campaign began on a note
of reason and moderation and ordinary political maneuver.
On November 12, he addressed a meeting of Liberals saying,
"I have done nothing ... which makes me ashamed to meet my
fellow Liberals. Please God, I am determined that I never
shall!" 17 He continued to describe the desired nature of
the peace settlement1
What are the principles on which that settlement
is to be effected1 Are we to lapse back into the old
national rivalries and animosities and competitive
armaments, or are we to initiate the reign on earth
of the Prince of Peace ... No settlement which contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a
permanent one .. ; We must not allow any sense of
revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to
override the fundamental principles of righteousness
... the mandate of this Government at the forthcoming
election will mean that the British delegation to the
Peace Conference will be in favour of a just peace ...
In my judgment the League of Nations is an absolute
essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the

16 The Times, November 28, 1918,
17 The Times, November 13, 1918.
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Peace Conference to gy~rantee that the League of
Nations is a reality.1
In the same speech, concerning domestic matters
Lloyd George said, "Let us utilize victory to get the
necessary impetus for reform!

We must instantly take in
hand an improvement of the conditions of the people." 19
However, in his second major address, at Newcastle
on November 29, the Prime Minister moved toward a more
radical position.

Lloyd George began by saying early in

his speech that "It must be a just peace, a sternly just
peace, a relentlessly just peace."

Germany had lost the

war and " ... must pay the costs of the war up to the limit
of her capacity to do so."

Lloyd George concluded his

remarks on peacemaking by reminding his audience that Germany had started the war.

The Government, therefore, intended to arrange a trail of the ex-Kaiser. 20
The course of the campaign speech and the hysteria

of the crowds led Lloyd George to endorse the idea that
Germany must be punished and she must pay for the war. In
a series of speeches 21 from November 29 - December 11, 1918,

18 The Times, November
13, 1918.
19The Times, November 13, 1918.
20 The Times, November
30, 1918.
21 For text of various speeches, see The Times,
November 30, 1918; December 6-13, 1918.
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Lloyd George's tone became more nationalistic.

By December

4, anti-German terms for peace far outshadowed the wartime
concern about trade competition.

From November 29 until

December 14, the anti-German issues were the main election
theme for the Coalition Candidates.
A Coalition manifesto, dated December 11, 1918,
was quite succinct1
1,

2.

J.

4.

5,

Punish the Kaiser.
Make Germany pay.
Get the soldiers home as quickly as possible.
Fair treatment to the returned soldier and
sailor.
Better housing and better social conditions. 22

Lloyd George's speech at Bristol on December 11, 1918,
encompassed these points.

Lloyd George led his audience to

believe that Britain "had an absolute right to demand the
whole cost of the war from Germany".

The Allied cost of

the war according to the "expert" British Imperial Committee
was~ 24,000,000,000;

but another Government financial

servant had warned Lloyd George that Germany might never be
able to pay that much.

Certainly Lloyd George knowingly

baited and intended to excite his audience by mentioning
the extraordinary figure of his experts.

That was why, he

continued, "we will extract the last penny we can out of
Germany up to the limit of her capacity, but I am not going
to mislead the public on the question of capacity ... and I
22M orning
.
P os t ,

December 2, 1918,

p.7.
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am not going to do it in order to win votes." 23

The

audience paid little attention to Lloyd George's qualifications, nor apparently did he expect his audience to.
Finally, Lloyd George summarized his position by
saying that Britain has an absolute right to demand the
whole cost of the war from Germany and that Britain would
do just that.

But Lloyd George said that the cost must be

extracted in such a way that it would not do more harm to
the country that receives it than the country which is paying for it.

He concluded by saying that the Allies, in

conjunction with Britain, are also studying the proposal, 24
Confidentially, Lloyd George said that he and
Bonar Law regarded the report of the expert committee studying Germany's capacity as "fantastic chimera." 25 The
committee to investigate German reparation liability consisted of William M.Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia;
Walter Long, Tory Politician; George Foster, economist;
Lord Cunliffe, the Governor General of the Bank of England;
Herbert Gibbs, London Banker; W.A.S. Hewins, economist. The

23 The Times, December 12, 1918. Cited also in
David Lloyd George, The Truth About Reparations and War
Debts (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), pp.14-15.
24 The Times, December 12, 1918, and Lloyd George,
The Truth About Reparation, pp.14-15,
25Lloyd George, Peace Conference Memoirs, I,
p.305.
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political orientation of this committee was hardly a representative body of opinion.

The committee's report which

estimated Germany's capacity to pay at~ 24,000,000,000
was circulated freely by Lloyd George;
the report was "fantastic chimera,"

even though he felt

it had electoral value.

Lloyd George knew how to employ his "experts" well,
used the same ploy at Paris on numerous occasions.

He
Charles

Seymour and Norman Davis of the American Peace Delegation
_noted that when Lloyd George meant to do business he
brought along E.J. Montagu and J.M. Keynes and when he was
going to hedge he brought in Lord Sumner and Lord Cunliffe. 26
Lloyd George was quite aware that the Treasury had prepared
a memorandum, written by economist and Treasury official
J.M. Keynes in late October and early November, 1918.
memorandum concerned indemnity and reparations.

This

In this

report Keynes recommended a much more realistic reparations
figure of between~ 2,000,000,000 and~ J,000,000,000.
Keynes warned about the "Economic consequences of indemnity"
and, in part conceded that "the capacity of the enemy to pay
falls short of the probable reparation claim." 27 These

26
Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace
Conference, ed., Harold B.Whiteman,Jr. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1965), p.276.
27
John Maynard Keynes, Activities and Associated
Writings: The Treasury and Versailles 1914-1919, Vol.XVI,
The Collected Writin s of John Ma ard Ke nes, ed. Elizabeth
Johnson
London: Macmillan, 1971 , pp.JJ -J8J.
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figures were, of course, not as politically impressive as
the figures recommended by the other "expert" committee;
Lloyd George did want to win the election, and therefore,
at this point in time, chose to ignore these figures in
favor of the more sensational ones of the other committee,
Others also had much to say about the election.
It was Sir Eric Geddes, Minister of Ways and Communications
for Demobilization of the British Armed Forces, who originated the cry of squeezing the German lemon.

He felt

Germany should pay restitution and reparation and felt that
"we will get everything out of her that you can squeeze out
of a lemon and a bit more . . ,,28 After Geddes' speech,
the popular cry was "squeeze the German lemon until the
pips squeak!" 29 But C.P. Scott, the influential editor of
the Manchester Guardian, was understanding of Lloyd George.
He felt that Lloyd George meant well at the beginning of
the election with regard to his stand for a just peace,
but seemed to lose sight of his goal under the strain of the
election, 30 Beatrice Webb was more disheartened by the
election spectacle,

She wrote•

I feel physically sick when I read the frenzied
appeals of the Coalition leaders - the Prime Minister,
28 The Times, December 10, 1918,

4, 1918,

2 9The Times, December 10, 1918,
30 Trevor Wilson, Diaries of C.P.Scott, December
p,362.

Winston Churchill and Geddes - to hang the Kaiser,
ruin and humiliate the German people, , . It may be
election talk, but it is mean brutal talk, degrading
to the electorate.31
Lloyd George and the Coalition won a landslide
victory and the Prime Minister received his mandate. One
author has said of the election that there was so little
opposition that there was little active enthusiasm.

The

anti-German comments made by Lloyd George seem to have
gained excessive importance just by the fact that they were
repeated on more than one occasion. 32
These anti-German remarks have been pushed forward by individuals seeking to find an easy explanation for
the failure of the Versailles Treaty.

This was a basic

point of Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes
felt that politics had ruined much of the credibility of
the peace conference. 3 3 Keynes believed that more important
was the phasing out of the Liberal party along with the
resurgence of the Conservatives to which Lloyd George had
tied himself,

The electoral victory and the election prom-

ises made by Lloyd George have been blamed for creating
political complications which would corrupt the Peace Con31Margaret I.Cole, ed., Beatrice Webb Diaries
1912-1924 (London1 Longmans, Green, 1952), p,139,
3 2David Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century
1914-1963 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), p.60.
33John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences
of the Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), Chapter II.
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ference.

Lord Salter, a member of the British Peace dele-

gation, weighed the effect of those pledges first hand.
Lord Salter felt that Lloyd George had allowed himself to
be associated and elected with a Parliament that was likely
to press "for the harshest sort of peace."

But as Lloyd

George was preparing for the peace conference, he recovered
from the "momentary lapse" and became determined to fight
for a "peace of reconciliation. ,,J 4

Ultimately, Lloyd

George did continue to handle matters pertaining to peace
in his own way and his moderate peace policies were basically
unchanged.
The Election of 1918 did, however, seem to put a
0

damper on Lloyd George 's program of moderation.

But even

after the election and political happenings in 1918, Lloyd
George was still able to continue pursuing peace according
to his conviction of moderation.

Lloyd George was commit-

ted to the war aims he presented in January 1918 and to the
aims he outlined in November and December of 1918,

It was

these aims and his sincere desire to achieve a just, lasting
and moderate peace that he carried with him to Paris in
January, 1919,
With the passing of the General Election, the
leaders of the British government and Empire were able to

34Lord Arthur Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant

(London: Faber and Faber, 1961),

p.1JO.
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turn their attention to more deliberate preparations for
peacemaking.

Though not fully agreed among themselves

about the important subject of compensation from Germany,
they were able to define their basic aims

principally

that the British Empire should have its just share of whatever Germany was able to pay

and to marshall the ideas

and arguments with which these aims might be pursued.
During the Peace Conference itself, British intentions and
thoughts were somewhat modified by the need to cooperate
with President Wilson, by an apparent shift back toward
Liberalism and moderation in British politics, and by an
intense and growing desire for demobilization among the
British public.

Chapter 4
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
Even with the many volumes that have been written
about the Paris Peace Conference, there remains a great deal
of confusion about Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference.

Traditionally, he has been viewed as motivated

only by political expediency:

He, Lloyd George, "lives for

the moment . . . and seizes any compromise".;. always ready to
sacrifice "future benefit for present gain. ,,i

J .!VI. Keynes

believed Lloyd George was thoroughly devoted to making a
just and lasting peace;

however, at Paris the Prime Min-

ister's "naturally good instincts, his industry, and his
inexhaustable nervous vitality were not serviceable." 2

In

nearly all accounts of the Peace Conference, authors claim
that Lloyd George was a captive of his election pledges.
A.J.P. Taylor has described the basic Lloyd George tactic:

1 Arno Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy,
2

pp.571-572.

John Maynard Keynes, Essa~s in Biography (London:
Rupert Hart - Davis, 1951), pp.J6-J .
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Being a prisoner of the reactionaries, he would
give his gaolers rope enough to hang themselves. He
went along with their wild schemes until public opinion in England turned them around; then he appeared
as the Radical champion.
. tardy but victorious.3
But these were tactics only.

Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr)

observed that Lloyd George was concerned with the future
implications of present political decisions.

On the other

hand, Wilson was concerned with "remaking the world on
lines of his own ideas,"

arid Clemenceau was concerned
with moulding Europe to the interests of France. 4
Unlike Woodrow Wilson and Georges Clemenceau,
Lloyd George's peace-making positions are not well-known.
Wilson's peace program was outlined in a series of speeches
"The Fourteen Points," January 8, 1918;
Principles," February 11, 1918;

"The Four

"Four Points," July 4,1918;

"Five Particulars," September 17, 1918.

Clemenceau hoped

to win permanent territorial concessions on the Rhine
River as well as to gain every concession that would weaken
Germany and keep her in a second class position of power.
He was determined to win any concession which would permanently remove the German threat to French security. Interestingly, both Wilson and Clemenceau were no longer in office
and Lloyd George was the only major political figure at Paris

1960),

3A.J.P.Taylor, The Trouble Makers, p.159.
4 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (London: Macmillan,
pp.77-78.

39

to survive the Conference and have the opportunity to carry
out his plans.

It seems that most people expected the

Wilson Peace Program to serve as the ideal basis upon
which a lasting peace could be built,

However, L.S. Amery

has noted that "Neither the Germans in their utter collapse,
nor the Allies, after all they had suffered, could ever
have expected Wilson's Fourteen Points to be taken literally,"5

Fundamental differences between France and Britain

on how peace was to be achieved and maintained appeared
almost immediately after the war.
mented that "the war is over.

Winston Churchill com-

I mean the period of joint

united effort for common purpose.

It will never recur.
Now we are fighting each other again." 6 Throughout the
Conference, Anglo-French differences had an influence on

most decisions.
On January 18, 1919, the Paris Peace Conference
was formally opened.

The work of the Conference progressed

slowly for more than two months before the Big Four settled
down to closed sessions to hammer out the most difficult
aspects of the treaty.
adopted
Nations.

On January 25, the Conference

a resolution for the creation of a League of
The drafting of the League Constitution and drafts

5L.S. Amery, War and Peace,
6
Lord Ridde 11 , ==L'=o~r-=dc.. .:cRo.=ic;d,_,d=,e,-=l::.cl=-c-:'sc-=-'I=n:,:,t,=im=a'-"t-=e-==D:.=i:.;ar:;:...,yc.....::o=f
the Peace Conference and After 1 18-1 2 (London: Victor
Gollancz, Lt., 1933 , p,15,
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on economics, territorial. questions, disarmament, and
reparations

were sent to committees of "experts."

Germany and Russia were excluded from peacemaking, but nevertheless, developments within each country
inf'luenced the outcome of the Paris Peace Conf'erence.

It

was Lloyd George who pressed the conf'erence to make a
decision of Russian policy and Russian representation. He
urged the Conf'erence "to decide whether to withdraw the.ir
troops or to reinf'orce them," and said that the conf'erence
should be prepared to accept the Bolsheviks if they represented the prevalent opinion in Russia. 7

'rhe Delegation

agreed to meet the representatives of the various Russian
governments away from Paris, 8 as Clemenceau was opposed to
inviting the Bolsheviks to Paris, much less talking to
them. 9

So a compromise was reached and Wilson draf'ted the

"Prinkipo Summons," an invitation to Russia to meet at the
Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, by February 15, 1919, 10
The purpose of the meeting was to help "to bring Russia
peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present
7u.S.Department of State, Papers Relating to the
Forei
Relations of the United States, "The Paris Peace
Conf'erence" Washington1 U.S.Printing 0ffice,194-1-194-7), III,
pp. 4-90-4-91 .
8

Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I,
pp. 229-232,
9Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I,
p.226.
10Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,!,
p.238.
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troubles. ,,ll
The proposed conf'erence was a failure.

There was

a good deal of opposition from Winston Churchill and the
rightest forces who wanted armed intervention.

Lloyd George

defended his policy in the Commons on February 12, 1919, by
saying he had no intention of recognizing the Bolshevik
Government.

But he cautioned the members to consider that

"America will send neither men, money, nor material, and,
therefore, it practically falls upon France and ourselves.
Has anyone calculated the cost?" 12 On this matter, Arno
Mayer declares that "instead of providing strong leadership,
Lloyd George vacillated and hedged,"iJ

Yes, Lloyd George

"hedged," but his stand on intervention did.not.
Winston Churchill confesses to Lloyd George:

Later

"You have

gone on consistently, never varying, but always with the
same fixed idea." 14 Nevertheless, the Prinkipo Summons
failed to bring an end to strife in Russia.
When the active discussions on Russia subsided,
discussion about the French search for security dominated

11 Arno Mayer, Peacemaking,

pp.410-449.

Mayer, Peacemaking,

p.444.

Mayer, Peacemaking,

p.444.

14
Frances Lloyd George (Frances Stevenson),
Lloyd George: A Diary, ed., A.J.P. Taylor (London:
Hutchinson, 1971), pp,197-198,
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the remainder of the Conference, either in the form of
territorial concessions, disarmament, treaties of guarantee,
reparations or economic restrictions.

The fear of Germany

again becoming powerful in the future controlled French
actions.

And Lloyd George did appreciate the French de-

sire for security within relevant boundaries.
The Allies'claims for reparations and the attempts
to include demands for the entire cost of the war proved to
be a very disruptive matter.

Making Germany pay for the

war was also one of the most politically sensitive topics
of the peacemakers.

Arnold Toynbee declared, "the Repara-

tion Chapter in the Treaty of Versailles

at once the

most important and at once the least conclusive piece of
work the Peace Conference left behind." 1 5 As it turned
out, reparations became the most important topic of the
post-Conference diplomacy.
A special commission to study reparation was
established January 23, 1919,

The duties of this Committee,

whose creation was born in a resolution submitted to the
Council of Ten by Lloyd George, were to determine evaluation
of reparations, the capacity of Germany to pay, and guarantees to insure the fulfillment of economic obligations.
Progress on reparations through March 1919 was very slow

15Arnold J.Toynbee, The World After the Peace Conference (London1 Oxford Press, 1930), p.3.

4J

and indecisive.

The Americans, at this point, refused to

yield their position that it was impossible to demand German payment of the full war costs since this had not been
spelled out in the Lansing Note or the Armistice to which
Germany agreed to enter peace negotiations.
Wilson believed that a precise reparation figure
should be written into the Treaty.

Lloyd George was uncom-

fortably aware that Bonar Law and other Unionists took the
same view, but with the aid of Clemenceau and Orlando he
persuaded the President to give way.

Wilson then took his

stand on the i_ssue that, whatever sum the Reparations Commission decided upon, the payments should not be extended
over any longer period than thirty years.

If Germany were

able to pay off the full sum during that period, all well
and good;

if not, she ought to pay the most that she could

and the League of Nations would be asked to confirm that
she was paying to the limit of her capacity.
and Orlando were strongly opposed to this;

Clemenceau
Clemenceau de-

clared that the sum ought to be paid in full even if it
took a thousand years to do so.

Lloyd George supported

Wilson, who threatened to return home if the French remained
intransigent, and Clemenceau eventually gave way. 16
At this point, the House of Commons was becoming
quite vocal about whether or not Lloyd George intended to
16Peter Rowland, Lloyd George,

pp.487-491,
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carry out his election promises.

So under the circumstances

it is not surprising that in response to the question of
whether he would press for reparations and make Germany pay
to the fullest extent the cost of the war, Lloyd George
responded on February 12, 1919:

"This is the election

pledge I gave after very careful consideration by the Cabinet. The government stands by every word of that pledge." 1 7
So the Prime Minister gave in on the question of including
war costs in the Reparation bill, and did so, under the
pressure of public opinion.

Thus, Lloyd George committed

himself in London to a policy which greatly handicapped him
in Paris.

After Britain had given up her demands for war

costs, Lloyd George stated in a more moderate fashion that
he "was definitely of the opinion that we were by the
Armistice terms not to demand an indemnity which would inelude the cost of prosecuting the war . . ,,18
The crucial question pertained to the amount of
reparations that the Allies would ask of Germany.

And

quite apart from the difficulty in reaching agreement on
what it was that Germany was supposed to be paying for was
the problem of ascertaining what the sum actually amounted
to;

and in addition to the issue of how the spoils were to

17 The Times, February 1J, 1919,
18 Thomas Jones, Lloyd George, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1951), p,172.
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be divided, there was the problem of wheth~r Germany would
be able to pay very much at all.

At the present time her

industries were in ruin and her people were starving.

Lloyd

George had endeavored in his election speeches to warn his
audiences that Germany's capacity to pay might be limited,
but he was sadly aware that the majority of his listeners
felt otherwise. 19
An estimate of the damage done, the cost of
restoration, and the evaluation of Germany's capacity to
pay would take months.

And the Conference was deadlocked

on all of these questions.

Charles Seymour of the American

Delegation wrote that "the important thing, seeing that
Germany has only so much she can pay, was to find out how
much that is and then decide how it is to be distributed," 20
It was no easy task however to decide how much
Germany could pay, much less to come to an agreement as to
the distribution of any reparations received.

British esti-

mates ranged from a low of~ J,000 million suggested by

J.M. Keynes to the~ 12-24,000 million of Lord Sumner and
Lord Cunliffe. 21

The French felt that Germany was capable

1 9Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.488.
20
Charles Seymour, Letters From the Peace Conference, p,171,
21
J.M. Keynes, Activities and Associated Writings,
XVI, pp,JJ6-J8J, and Lloyd George, The Truth About Reparation, pp,11-13,
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of~ 30,000 million, although they were generally quite
reluctant to commit themselves to a definite claim.

Lord

Sumner said, "France does not know what her reparation and
damage claim is and obviously is most unwilling to risk an
estimate or a statistical computation." 22
There was great concern within the Cabinet that
Great Britain and especially the Dominions would be excluded from reparations. Germany's reserves and ability to
· pay would be exhausted and thus prevent the British Empire
from receiving any payments from Germany.

Lloyd George

pointed out to his Cabinet that it was important to determine how much Germany could pay, and even if it took a long
time to decide on the distribution of the amount, it was
important "that we should make peace soon in order that
trade might be restored." 2 3
The domestic political pressure on all the major
representatives at Paris was real and constant.

Bonar Law

did speak in moderation about Lloyd George and the election
pledges, but by April there was a movement underway to
recall Lloyd George from Paris to remind him of his election
pledges.
Meanwhile, the Paris Peace Conference dragged on
and in March, after nearly three months, no hope of conclu22

I,

Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,

p.332.
23 CAB 23, WC 536, February 25, 1919,
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sion was in sight.

After a meeting of Lloyd George,

Woodrow Wilson and French Premier Georges Clemenceau on
March 20, 1919, Colonel House approached Clemenceau to ask
him what had taken place during the meeting and how they
got along.

Clemenceau replied, "Splendidly, we disagreed
about everything. n 24 Sir Maurice Hankey, one of Lloyd
George's close companions, also lamented over the fate of
the Conference and Germanys

he felt that the economic and

financial condition would "be our bottleneck,"

He also

worried that the election promises would cause many problems in peacemaking.

And he also believed that reparations

was a very difficult g_uestion.

He said that "it is out-

rageous and intolerable that Germany should not pay, and
yet, if she is made to pay, we may raise such a danger as
may overwhelm civilization itself. n 2 5 And Hankey was
correct on virtually all points.
General Smuts was certain that the Conference had
lost direction and "was taking a bad turn. " 26 Actually,
Smuts did not believe the Conference had much sense of
direction in the first place:

"the treaty began to take

24w.M.Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem 1918-1939 (Londons Oxford University Press,
1943), pp. 32-33,
2

5Thomas Jones, Whitehall,
26 W.K. Hancock, Smuts, I,

p.81.
p.509.
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shape in bits and pieces, without any central focus ... " 27
Even Lloyd George confided to Lord Riddell that "the Conference is not going well," 28 And Philip Kerr and Sir
Maurice Hankey advised the Prime Minister of the "uneasiness" about the direction of the Conference. 29
On March 21, Lloyd George asked a few of his key
advisors to retire with him to Fontainebleau for the weekend of March 22-24 in order to reassess England's and the
Empire's position.

Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Maurice Hankey and

Philip Kerr were chosen to reconsider aims and objectives
of the Peace Conference.

This was definitely an attempt to

get the Conference back on the right track.

Frances

Stevenson, Lloyd George's personal secretary, wrote in her
diary on that day:

"He is determined, too, to take the

bull by the horns and to force decisions on the vital points
during the coming week,"JO

She went on to say that "when

he withdraws from the world in that way for 24 hours, something is bound to happen."3l

On the following day, under

Lloyd George's guidance, Kerr started drafting what became

27w.K. Hancock, Smuts, I, p.509.
28 Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary,
pp.36-37,
29Arno Mayer, Peacemaking,

pp,518-519,

3 °Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George,
31 Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George,

p,175,
p.175.
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known as the Fontainebleau Memorandum,
which bore the date March 25, 1919,

the final version

It was in two parts,

the first section setting out "Some considerations for the
Peace Conference before they draft their final terms" and
the second section summarizing the type of settlement that
the British wanted to see. 32 The Fontainebleau Memorandum
was a tactical and strategic move designed to bring the
British and Americans closer together in an attempt to block
the French;

to show labor in Britain that a bit of Liberal-

ism still survived in Lloyd George;
Bolshevism into Europe;

to stop the drive of

and to express Lloyd George's own

inner beliefs about the future of Europe and the need for
a peace which Germany could live with.

General Smuts wrote

that Lloyd George "appears even prepared to face the situation and go under if necessary."33

Frances Stevenson said

that "He is taking the long view about the Peace, and insists
that it should be one that will not leave bitterness for
years to come,, ... 34
Lloyd George emphasized, in the first section of
the memorandum, that any attempts to maintain the ·pe·ace by
keeping Germany in a permanent state of weakness were bound
to fail:
3 2Peter Rowland, Lloyd George,

pp,484-486;

33W.K.Hancock, Smuts, I, p,513,
34Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George,

p.175,
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You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her
armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that
of a fifth-rate power; all the same, in the end if she
feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace
of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution
from her conquerors . . . The proposal of the Polish
commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different
religion and which has never proved its capacity for
stable self-government throughout its history must
lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe. Secondly, I would say that the duration for
payments of reparation ought to disappear if possible
with the new generation which made the war.3 5
The possibility that Germany might throw in her
lot with the Bolsheviks, rather than submit to a humiliating peace, was underlined;

the memorandum went on to

emphasize the desirability of the members of the League of
Nations to undertake to limit their own armaments as well
as those of Germany:
If the League is to do its work for the world it
will only be because the members of the League trust
it themselves and because there are no rivalries and
jealousies in the matter of armaments between them.JS
The second half of the memorandum envisaged an
agreement by the principal members of the League to end competition in armaments.

The Rhenish provinces would remain

part of Germany but would be demilitarized.

France would

be compensated for this by a guarantee of assistance from
the British Empire and the United States which would remain

35Peter Rowland, Lloyd George,
3 6Peter Rowland, Lloyd George,

p.485,
p.485.
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in force until the League provided adequate security.
France would also be compensated by the return of AlsaceLorraine together with either the Saar Valley or compensation for the destruction of her coal mines.

Poland would

be given a corridor to Danzig which would embrace the
smallest possible number of Germans.

Germany would under-

take to pay full reparations and a tentative scheme would
be devised for settling the precise amount and determining
the method of payment.37
The Fontainebleau Memorandum was an attempt to
create a firm and just outline for peace.

Lloyd George

covered termination of war, the League of Nations, political
boundaries, disarmament, reparation, punishment of war
criminals and economics.

The historian, Richard Ullman,

describes the nature of Lloyd George's effort by saying
that "neither within his own government nor within those of
its allies were there leaders who were willing to expend
their political capital to achieve the same outcome ... 38
Wilson and Clemenceau were presented with copies
of this memorandum.

The President was broadly in sympathy

with its objectives, but Clemenceau was not at all impressed.
37Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, pp.485-486.
38 Richard H.Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet Accord, Vol.
III, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Princeton1 Princeton
University Press, 1972), p.459,
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He made it clear that France had no desire whatsoever to be
kind to Germany or to apologize for having won the war.
France wanted full payment for past misdemeanors and positive guarantees against their repetition in the future. 39
Clemenceau delivered his reply.

He was still con-

cerned about gaining permanent advantage over Germany and
warned of "sparing the vanquished at the expense of the
victors." 4
Clemenceau also complained to Lloyd George that

°

"If you don't give me what I want, I can't meet my people,
I shall have to resign. ,. 4 l
Thus, with the memorandum, the British position
became clear and the divergence between.the British and the
French position more apparent.

The British sought the eco-

nomic restoration of Germany and Europe as a means to peace
and as a means to stopping the spread of Bolshevism, while
the French believed that a weak Germany and a strong France
would insure peace in Europe.
The Fontainebleau Memorandum did not in itself
quicken the progress at the Paris Peace Conference; however,
it did provide for a measure of test of Lloyd George's
strength in Parliament.

The House of Commons wanted to

3 9Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.486.
40 Arno Mayer, Peacemaking, p,595.
41 Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After
(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p.187.
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ascertain whether or not Lloyd George was going to stand by
his election pledges or not.
Lloyd George was now going to have to answer to
the Conservative majority and he readily realized the disadvantage of his alliance with them.

Two hundred and

thirty-three Unionist M,P.'s, greatly perturbed by the
reports of the Conference appearing in the press, sent Lloyd
George a telegram on April 8.

The telegram began by saying

that rather than ask for the complete cost of the war the
British delegation was considering only what could be exacted from the enemy•,

The telegram went on to say that "our

constituents have always expected

and still expect

that the first action of the Peace Delegates would be to
present the Bill in full,,."

And the telegram ended by

asking for assurance that the British Delegation had in no
way departed from its original intention. 42 Lloyd George
immediately replied to the telegram that he "stood faithfully by all his pledges" 4 3and said that he would return
to the House of Commons to speak in his own defense.
On April 16, 1919 Lloyd George delivered before
the Commons a summary of the problems and progress of the
peace conference.

I,
I,

He claimed that his pledges, as well as

42 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,
pp,374-375.
43Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,
p.375,
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those of almost every other politician, contained declarations about how Germany should be punished.
pledges were not made in mere haste;

His own

had he not talked of

reparation and compensation for service men a few days before President Wilson delivered his "Fourteen Points?"
Lloyd George even challenged any newspaper to publish the
forthcoming peace terms in parallel columns with the
pledges made by the government.
the challenge. 44

No newspaper ever accepted

He ended his defense with an appeal for

world peace and an appeal " ... not to soil his triumph of
right by indulging in the anger passions of the moment,
but to consecrate the sacrifices of millions to the permanent redemption of the human race from the scourge and
agony of war . " 4 5
The conclusion one might draw from the reception
of Lloyd George's speech in Parliament is that the three
hundred and seventy members who endorsed the recall of
Lloyd George were not committed to a major change in direction of his work at Paris and that the election pledges
made by Lloyd George were not as great a burden as is usually portrayed.

I,

Lloyd George says the "opposition

44Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,

pp.380-381.

45 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,
I,

p.383.
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collapsed utterly, "46
To place in proper perspective the events of
Lloyd George's recall to the House of Commons and his resulting'speech, one must keep in mind the breakthroughs in
negotiations made during the first two weeks of April,
During those weeks Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau
were able to reach agreement on most of the points of concern to the radical Conservatives.

The idea of presenting

a bill to Germany for strictly reparations was dropped,
Moreover, Lloyd George had also abandoned the idea of fixing a time period on the reparation, so that, for example,
Britain might collect what she could within thirty years,
but then be able to collect no more.

The fixing of the

amount as well as the time in which to pay it was to be
left to the Reparations Commission.

Lloyd George also

agreed to the occupation of the Rhineland and French control
of the Saar for fifteen years, 4 7
Another significant development was that the byelections of April 11, 1919, indicated that the public was
changing its attitude toward Germany
to peace terms.

at least in regard

British public opinion was finally turning

46Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,

I,

p.383.

I,

47Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,
pp,375-384.

toward a more moderate attitude,

It was becoming more

obvious that the public had not viewed the policy of moderation which Lloyd George was trying to follow as severely
as did the Parliament.

As one observer put it, "the great

masses of people in this country are thoroughly tired of the
war." 48 The anti-German hysteria of the Election of 1918
in December had subsided.

The public as well as the

Commons was coming around more and more to Lloyd George's
moderate position.

His opposition was really never silenced,

but having appeased them somewhat by his moves of the late
winter and spring, having seen his policy at least indirectly vindicated at the polls during the by-election held on

April 11, 1919, and having triumphed on the floor of the
Commons on April 16, he could be reasonably sure that if he
made no large mistakes, there would be no further serious
challenge of his authority,
Therefore, the election pledges had brought Lloyd
George back to London to face a hostile Parliament. However, it does not seem that he was totally bound by these
pledges at the Paris Peace Conference.

Thomas Jones be-

lieves that Lloyd George's actions in Paris "were governed"
by his election pledges and that he "usually, but not always,

48 Reginald Viscount Esher, The Captains and the
Kin s·De art: Journals and Letters of Reinald Viscount
Esher, ed., Oliver Viscount Esher New York: Charles
Scribner and Sons, 1938), p.228,
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tried to interpret them in Germany's favor," but that the
pressure from the press and Parliament "made it difficult
for him to follow the dictates of his intelligence," 49
Examples of how Lloyd George· protected himself on various
issues can be found throughout the conference,

General

Smuts, in a letter to Lloyd George, reiterated that Lloyd
George had earlier said that unless representatives of the
British Empire were unanimous on the question of reparations,
as well as other peace terms, that he would have to support
the "whole hoggers" and that might mean that no peace at
all would be signed,50

Therefore, the degree to which

Lloyd George was affected by the election pledges and the
degree to which he responded to political pressures became
very important.
Having quelled the opposition at home, ~loyd
George was able to operate more freely in accordance with
his own more moderate aims, insofar as he had not had to
tie his hands to win this freedom.

Lloyd George had always

felt that the restoration of the German economy was vital
to the restoration of Great Britain's own economy. Something now had to be done to prevent the imminent economic
destruction of Europe.

Lloyd George also had doubts about

4 9Thomas Jones,· Lloyd George,

p.172.

50w.K.Hancock and J.Van Der Poel, eds.Selections
From the Smuts Papers (London1 Cambridge University Press,
1966), IV, Letter 937, pp,120-121,
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Germany losing Upper Silesia to Poland, paying the large
reparation, and being burdened with the war guilt clause,
In these matters, Lloyd George did not stand alone.

The

South African.delegation was also skeptical of the practicality of the reparations clauses.

General Smuts said

that "mad people still believe the British industry will
profit from the industrial annihilation of Germany,,,5 1
The Germans arrived at Versailles but were obliged to wait while the treaty was put into final form under
the general supervision of Lloyd George, Wilson and
Clemenceau.

They had been working in close association

with one another for almost four months by this time, and
despite a basic rapport, their relationship was strained.5

2

The Treaty, assembled in a great hurry and based
on many undiscussed and unamended findings of the varioµs
commissions, was formally presented to the German representatives at the Trianon Palace at Versailles on May 7,
1919,

The Germans were given fifteen days in which to

study it.

Lloyd George and many of his colleagues were

appalled at the punitive nature of the terms.

It was

generally agreed that the terms were so humiliating that
Germany would be quite justified in refusing to accept them

951,

51 w.K. Hancock, Selections From Smuts, IV, Letter
p,140.
52 Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p,492,
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and Lloyd George was empowered to go back to the Council
of' Four and press f'or modifications

- and to employ, more-

over, the threat that Britain would otherwise refuse to
renew the war or take part in the blockade of' Germany, if'
the terms were rejected.5 3
The Germans did object strongly to the Treaty,
and especially to the war guilt clauses which pinned f'ull
responsibility on them f'or having started the war.

The

German observations on the Draft Treaty were received on
May 29, 1919,

The German government made detailed counter-

proposals to the Reparations Articles,

they were prepared

to pay up to a maximum sum of' one hundred billion gold
marks, twenty billion on May 1, 1926, and the remainder
interest-free in annual payments to be set at a later date.5 4
Lloyd George examined the German Delegation's
response on May 29, 1919, with the intention of' giving the
uppermost consideration to those appeals which sought to
alter the main clauses of' the treaty.

The Prime Minister

still believed that a f'ixed sum would be best and that the
Germans should be given time to assess the damage and to
submit a f'ixed sum f'or reparation based on Germany's capa-

53Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.493.
54
Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris
PeaceConf'erence (New York: Columbia University Press,
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city to pay. 55
Lloyd George called for all the British Ministers
and Dominion Premiers to meet on June 1, 1919, to consider
modification of the Draft Treaty.

The meeting resulted in

the preparation of a list of proposed modifications1
clauses dealing with the Eastern frontiers;
German entry into the League of Nations;
ing with the army of occupation;
reparation clauses.

the date of

the clause deal-

and most importantly, the

These modifications could be carried

out by either of two methods.

Either Germany could under-

take the whole task of restoration, plus the paying of a
fixed sum to be divided among the Allies, or else she
could sign the Reparation Clauses as they stood and within
three months make an offer in cash and kind to settle her
entire liability. 56 So the British government had come to
realize that the Economic Clauses were too severe and that
they "risked not getting anything from Germany by asking
too much, ,, 57
Lloyd George felt the British delegation had to
stand by its proposed modifications "even if it were neces-

I,

55Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,
pp.459-461.
5 6Arno Mayer, Peacemaking, pp,797-800,

ference,

57 charles Seymour, Letters From the Peace Conp.256.

sary to withold our· signature to the treaty." 58 The French
were visibly upset. Their position remained that they had
been attacked and they were victorious;
would cede nothing to Germany.

therefore, they

Lloyd George's proposals

seemed to be whittled away one by one by French opposition.
Andre Tardieu has said that "after a few hard words

- face

to face

the distance between the two points of view
grew less and that of the French made headway. " 59
On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was
signed.

Explicit provisions which would have made Germany

pay the whole cost of the war were not incorporated into the
final treaty.

Instead, Germany accepted general responsibi-

lity for", .. causing all the loss and damage to which the
Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have
been subjected ... " 60 A fixed reparation sum could not be
arrived at, so a commission was established to study the
amount of damage for which compensation would be due from
Germany, as well as the method and means by which payment
was to be made,

The Commission was to make its decision

on or by May 1, 1921.

I,

p.481.
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At the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George had
been subjected to many pressures:

an aroused public de-

manding payment for war costs and the punishment of war
criminals;

and a House of Commons basically imperialistic
in outlook also demanded severe treatment of Germany. 61
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister still tried to carry out
the more moderate principles that Germany had to pay for
the damage she had caused up to her capacity to pay and
that Great Britain had to be willing to limit her demands
to the level of what could be paid without injury to British
. d us t ry. 62
t ra d e an d in
Lord Curzon was one whose views reflected this
trend.

He believed that it would be most difficult to say

what Germany would be able to pay in the next thirty years.
The Treaty of Versailles had secured for Great Britain and
her Allies full reparation, and in view of the economic
uncertainty of the future, a modification of the terms of
the treaty to meet the needs of the situation would be
6
possible at any time. 3 The British appeared willing to
follow a very flexible policy toward fulfillment of the
treaty by the Germans.

ference,

The economic recovery of Germany
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was essential to the European economic system and to the
economic health of Great Britain.
Lloyd George returned to London and was welcomed
at Victoria Station by King George V, the Prince of Wales,
and an enthusiastic crowd.

Lloyd George then delivered a

speech to an awaiting crowd as being "charged with hope,"
and for the British people to "rejoice in this great viet ory ... ,.64 Five weeks later Lloyd George was presented
with the Order of Merit in recognition of his pre-eminent
services "both in carrying out the war to a victorious
end and in securing an honorable peace." 6 5 It was, perhaps,
as honorable a peace as circumstances would permit, but
there were many things wrong with it and Lloyd George was
under no illusions about the permanence of the settlement.
"We shall have to do the whole thing over again in twentyfive years," he glumly remarked, "at three times the
cost. " 66
The treaty was ratified by the House of Commons
on July 21, 1919,

There were only four dissenting votes.

Of those four, three were Home Rulers protesting the lack
of any provisions for Irish Home Rule, and the other was
64
6
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61.J6
that of a Radical recently elected. 7
Although the treaty had been unanimously approved
by the House of Commons, this did not represent the true
feelings of the British people.

Opposition to the treaty

was growing throughout Britain and on June 5, 1919, the
Labour Party called the treaty a "violation of the understanding upon which the armistice was signed," and that a
"reparation of five billion pounds would be satisfactory."
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Earlier, discontent with the peace proposal had
been growing within the British delegation at the Peace
Conference,

John Maynard Keynes was quite disillusioned

by the Conference and the proposed treaty.

Keynes was

deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and principal
representative of the British Treasury at the Peace Conference.

The important thing to Keynes had been for Britain

and her Allies to work for world peace and "to establish
world affairs on a new and better basis, so that this
shall not happen again.

May no other generation live under
the cloud we live under." 6 9
At Paris, Keynes thought he had his chance to
pursue peace, but he was not even appointed to the Repara67 A.J.P. ·Taylor, English History, pp,135-136.
68 The Times, June 16, 1919, p,13,
69R.F'. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes
(New York: St.Martin's Press, 1966), p,215,
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tions Commission.

Unfortunately for Keynes, his great

ability as an economist was still basically unknown to all
but a few, and he was only occasionally consulted by Lloyd
George.

Keynes wrote to his mother;

"the Peace is out-

rageous and impossible and can bring nothing but misfortune
behind it ... ,. 7 o He was upset by the "morbid" 71 atmosphere
at Paris, so he resigned on June 7, 1919,

In December,

1919, he published The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
Keynes argued that Europe could prosper only when Germany
was restored to her old economic strength, and he blamed
the peacemakers for all the sufferings which the Germans
had brought on themselves, and on Europe, not only by being
defeated but from having waged war at all.
As to the amount of reparation Germany could pay,
Keynes estimated two billion pounds would be a safe figure
based on pre-war productivity and potential levels of production after the war.

Keynes believed that the peace-

makers did not realize that the most serious problems "were
not political ·or territorial but financial and economic." 72
Keynes concluded that the Treaty of Versailles could not
stand unless there was a general revision of the treaty and

70 R.F.Harrod, Life of Keynes, p.229,
71Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.77.
72 J.M.Keynes, Economic Consequences, p,1¼6.
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a settlement of inter-Allied debts. 73
After the signing of the treaty, the British
Government stated its policy toward Germany.

The Treaty

of Versailles would be upheld and justified, but it would
also be subject to modification in a more moderate direction.

There were few people in 1919 who actually believed

that the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
would bring a lasting peace to Europe.

Each of the great

powers differed in its interpretation of the document and
began to pursue widely divergent policies.

This resulted

in a series of Conferences among the concerned powers
during the years of 1919-1922,

?JJ,M. Keynes, Economic Consequences,

p.256.

Chapter 5
POST-PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE ERA
From 1919 to 1922, there were numerous international conferences convened to deal with post-war
problems of economics, Germany, reparation, disarmament
and treaty enforcement in general,

If there was one indi-

vidual responsible for this series of conferences, it was
Lloyd George.

Diplomacy by conferences was of utmost

importance to him, and he deemed conferences of Premiers
the best means of expediting the work of diplomacy;

as a

result, there were twenty-three major conferences convened
during the last three years of Lloyd George's administration, 1920-1922, 1
During 1920-1922, Lloyd George attended conference
after conference.
failures.

Some of them were useful;

others were

It may be noted that during this period, the

Middle East situation was sorted out at an early stage,
with France receiving a mandate for Syria and Britain receiving mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia;

the Dutch

Government steadfastly refused to hand over the ex-Kaiser to
the Allies and America refused to ratify the Versailles
Treaty.

Discussions were taking place during the early

1 Charles Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp,112-119,
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part of 1920 concerning the Turkish treaty.

There was grow-

ing public opinion against the Versailles Treaty in Britain,
and throughout the world.

And the possibility of a general

Bolshevik revolution across Germany was at hand.

Lloyd

George was deeply concerned about the welfare of Germany,
but he was also quite worried about maintaining a united
front with France.
It would be an involved and detailed undertaking
to analyze each international conference during the period
1919-1922.

This study therefore limits its attention to

select representative conferences.

These conferences reflect

the theme of the French drive for security and the British
determination to restore Europe to her former economic
prosperity which had been interpreted as being fundamental
to a peaceful world.

Each of these broad problems were

multifaceted as well.

The economic question developed

around the collection of German reparations and inter-Allied
debts.

The Allied debt problem was made especialy difficult

by the withdrawal of the United States, the primary creditor

of the Allies, from Europe and herabsolute refusal to

make any deals on alleviating the burden of Europe's debt.
The first seven months of 1920 saw Lloyd George's
diplomacy by conference put to a severe test.

The year

opened with conferences at Paris and London.

Other con-

ferences followed in rapid succession in an attempt to solve
Europe's problems as well as seeing that Germany complied

with the terms of the peace settlement.

But, first of all,

Lloyd George's efforts to seek relatively moderate treatment of Germany were always hampered by internal problems
within Germany.

And secondly, the great dilemma for Lloyd

George was whether the interests of peace were best served
by pressing his policy of reconciliation on economic matters
and perhaps destroying the possibility of good relations
with France or if peace was best served only be protesting
and then letting France pursue her Rhineland strategy.
Therefore, from 1920-1922, Lloyd George caused many conferences to be convened and often dominated their proceedings.
The period from January 1920 to May 1921 was one
of many conferences held to implement the collection of
one billion pounds reparation due by May 1, 1921;
trying to arrive at a fixed sum of liability;

of

and of at-

tempting to bridge an ever-widening gap between the British
and the French relations.
A Prime Ministers' conference was held at San
Remo, Italy, April 18-26, 1920.

At this conference, Lloyd

George clearly stated the British position regarding the
use of force in enforcing the terms of the treaty.

Lloyd

George believed that the occupation of any German territory
was a most unsatisfactory way of dealing with the problem
and would only arouse the military spirit of Germany.

"The

best plan would be to have a straight talk with them and
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find out what can be done," 2

The present system, advocated

by the French, of acting unilaterally, using force, and
dictating terms to the Germans had failed completely.
The San Remo conference was concerned not only
with mending the British and French rift but also with the
impending definition of the extent of German war reparation.
Lloyd George still believed that if Germany were ever to be
expected to pay, her.liability must be established.

This

could only be done by way of direct negotiations with the
German government. 3

Consequently, France would only agree

to the summoning of a conference with the Germans if the
"Allies meant to insist on the integral enforcement of the
treaty, and secondly, as to the action they should take in
the event of Germany failing to execute it. 4
Thus, San Remo was the first of many conferences
called to deal further with the problem of establishing
German liabilities in the form of a lump sum before the
Reparations Commission made its decision on May 21, 1921,
and secondly, of collecting the one billion pounds sterling

2

Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury,, eds., Documents on
British Forei
Polic 1 19-19
(London: Her Majesty's
Stationary Office, 1958 , VII, Series I, Document 2, p.7.
3Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy,
VII, Series I, Document 2, pp,13-17,
4

Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy,
VII, Series I, Document 2, p.13.
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due·from Germany by May 1, 1921,

There had been much frank

talk at the Conference between France and Britain and for
the present time, much misunderstanding had been removed.
Commenting in the House of Commons on his work at
San Remo, Lloyd George said that the Allied complaint was
"not that Germany had not paid toward the one billion due
by May 1, 1921;

we knew she could not pay."

The question

pertained to the "integral enforcement of the treaty, and
secondly, as to the action they should take in the event of
Germany failing to execute it."5
Meanwhile, two conferences concerning German
reparation and inter-allied debts were held, the Lympne
Conference of May 15-17 and the Boulogne Conference of June
21-22.

The preparatory conference at Lympne of May 15-17

was concerned solely with the question of reparations. In
'
an official communique, issued from the conference on May
16, the question of inter-allied debts was introduced into
.
th e reparat ion
ques t·ion. 6

The British government, however,

did not make any definite commitments on the inter-allied
debts.

The British believed that the sooner the reparation

question could be settled, the sooner the Allies could talkabout settling inter-allied debts.

The two subjects could

5Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy,
VII, Series I, Document 2, p.13.
6
A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs
1920-1923 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1925), p,117,
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and should be treated separately. 7

The French, however,

believed that inter-allied debts and reparations could not
be separated.

The payment of' her inter-allied debt depended

directly upon the reparations payments that she received
from Germany.

If' Germany would not pay, then France could
8
not be expected to pay her inter-allied debt.
The French
depended heavily upon reparation payments.

They had a uni-

a regular budget that balanced and an

que double budget

"extraordinary budget" that was three times as large as the
regular budget.

The "extraordinary budget" covered war

costs and reconstruction costs.

There was no provision for

receipts in the latter budget except the payment of' reparations by the Germans. 9

The communique did carry notice

that the French had agreed to prepare "proposals for fixing
a minimum total for the German debt which will be capable
of' acceptance by the Allies and at the same time compatible
with Germany's capacity to pay." 10 The French had agreed
to fix a definite sum for the reparation due from Germany.
The Boulogne Conference was held June 21-22, 1920.
Its primary purpose was to consider Allied counter-proposals

7sir Andrew McFadyean, Reparation Reviewed (London,
Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930), p.37.
8 Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Chicago,
Rand McNally, 1966), pp.454-455.
9Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, pp.454-455,
10 The Times, May 17, 1920.
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in case the German offer to be made at the future Spa Conference proved unsatisfactory.

It was decided that a

committee of experts be called to prepare a schedule of
payments by which Germany would be required to pay each
year a minimum sum. 11 The counter-proposals on German
reparation liability drafted by the Allied experts was
known as the "Boulogne Agreement",

Germany was to pay from

May 1, 1921, for forty-two years, a fixed annuity of three
billion gold marks per annum increasing to seven billion
gold marks per annum in 1931 for the remaining thirty-two
years;

the Reparations Commission was to be allowed to

grant partial postponement of additional payments;

and the

German government was to be allowed to float international
loans for reparation. 12
Next, the carefully planned conference on reparations was held--at Spa, Belgium on July 5-16, 1920.

This

conference was originally scheduled to be held on May 25,
1920, but was changed to the later date because of the
German elections.

The Germans had been invited to take

part in the Conference, and since there were elections to
the Reichstag being held, it was felt that to deal with a

11 Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign
Policy, VII, Series I, Documents 26-30, pp.307-331.
12 Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign
Policy, VII, Series I, Document 31 Appendix, pp.337-339.

government completely uncertain of its future would be
futile. 13 Thus, there was the postponement of the conference.
The Spa conference proved to be very important
for two re_asons:

first, Germany was asked to participate

in a conference with the Allies;

and second, the failure of

Germany to cooperate with the Allies discredited Lloyd
George's diplomacy and forced him to follow the French.
At the onset of the Spa Conference, the British
moderate policy toward German war reparation and the economic clauses of the treaty was quite clear as opposed to a
harsh French policy of military occupation.

In a speech

before President Frederich Ebert of Germany, and other
German government officials, July 1, 1920, Ambassador
D'Abernon said, "Economic reconstruction is the most imperative need of the world ... Narrow and short-sighted selfishness in this regard are altogether foreign to the
traditions of my country and are no less opposed to the
policy of His Majesty's government." 14 President Ebert
replied that he was in comple-te agreement with all that had
been said.

lJLord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary, p.191.
14viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Ra
1 221 The Diar -of an Ambassador Garden City:
Doran and Company, 1929, p.57.
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The attitude of the Prime Minister and his Foreign
Secretary, Lord Curzon, at the Spa Conference was one of
emphasizing the necessity of restoring the economy of
Germany. 1 5 The delegated purpose of the Spa Conference was
to make a final decision on the reparation clauses, especially the fixing of the final German reparation debt;
however, the conference from July 5 to July 9 became concerned primarily with the completion of Germany's disarmament.

From disarmament, the conference turned to coal

deliveries by Germany under the reparation clauses,

Germany

had fallen behind on the deliveries.
The Spa Conference nearly collapsed over the two
issues of disarmament and coal deliveries,

Coal deliveries

turned out to be the only facet of reparation extensively
discussed at the conference,

The question of cash-and-kind

reparation was referred to an Allied committee of experts,
The Allies had yet to complete their estimates of damages;
nor had the capacity of Germany to pay huge sums yet been
determined.

The meetings of the Allies and Germany were

often quite stormy,

Finally the Allied representatives

became so disturbed that the conference was suspended on
July 13, 1920, after the rejection of a German schedule for
future coal deliveries,

It was eventually necessary to

sign protocols on both subjects,

The protocol on disarma-

15 viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo,

p.70.

ment was signed on July 9, 1920, and the coal protocol on
July 16, 1920.

The protocols did not solve the disarmament

and coal delivery problem for the Allies, but they did serve
as temporary solutions; however, the coal protocol would
expire in six months and the Allies would be faced with the
problem of coal deliveries, But because of the outbursts by
the Germans at the conference, it was necessary for Lloyd
George to support the French demands for a show of force to
persuade Germany that the Allies meant to enforce the treaty.
Lloyd George had to agree to tell Germany what to do rather
than negotiating terms with them, and this was not what
Lloyd George had intended.
The reparation issue had been pushed aside by
the questions concerning disarmament and coal delivery.
However, an agreement on distribution of reparations was
arrived at.

The reparations were to be divided along the

following guidelines:

British Empire twenty-two per cent,

France fifty-two per cent, Italy ten per cent, Belgium
eight per cent, and the remainder to be divided among those
Allies receiving reparation payments.

Yet the crucial

question of how much Germany owed was still undecided.

And

the French were realizing that reparations, in vast sums,
would probably not be forthcoming and they dreaded to tell
their people at home this deduction. 16
16

Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, pp.454-455.
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Spa did not decrease Lloyd George's interest in
diplomacy by conference but for a time his energies were
needed at home to settle domestic problems.

His accomplish-

ments in domestic matters were far greater than his success
in Europe;

but it was these same successes at home that

alienated much of his Conservative backing which was already irritated at his conduct of foreign policy.
Interallied conferences continued throughout 1920_
in an effort to solve the German reparation problem.

The

British continued to insist on meeting with Germany in an
effort to negotiate a reparations settlement, and the French
consistently produced excuses for refusing to negotiate.
The basic argument of the French was that Germany continued
to evade her obligations. 1 7
The Brussels Conference, December 16-22, 1920,
called as a result of the failure of the Spa Conference,
was the last Allied attempt during 1920 to arrive at a
settlement of the reparation question.

There was an ob-

vious difference in atmosphere at this conference.

Instead

of the politicians that were present at Spa, the German
delegation was represented by Dr.Carl Bergmann, an expert
German financial economist and German State Secretary of

17Erich Eych, A Histor

of the Weimar Re ublic;
Translated by Harlan Hanson and Robert Waite Cambridge1
Harvard University Press, 1963), Vol.I.
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the Ministry of France.

There were no stormy arguments at

the conference such as had occurred at Spa.
though

It looked as

real progress toward a viable solution of the

reparation question might now be worked out.
ence adjourned for the holidays;

The confer-

this adjournment also

allowed time for the Germans to prepare a report on their
finances concerning their ability to pay reparations.

The

Conference reconvened in Paris on January 24, 1921,and ran
through January JO, 1921,
The Germans submitted their report at the reconvening of the Conference.

It stated that German

finances could not be put upon a sound basis until Germany
could be informed of her whole liability.

In the report

there was a suggestion that the fixation of the German
capital debt be postponed for five years and one hundred
fifty thousand pounds be paid annually during those years.

18

France could not agree to these terms, and unfortunately,
the hope that conclusions regarding reparations could be
reached at this phase of the conference ended.
phere of the whole conference changed.

The atmos-

The Supreme Council

had decided to add disarmaments to the agenda, "the experts
began to run away from their own conclusions, and the repara-

18Harold Nicolson,
1 2
A Stud in Post-War Di
Company, 193
pp.230-231,

The Last Phase 1 1 London1 Constable and
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tion question once again became a political issue," 19 as it
had been throughout the greater part of the period.
At the first meeting of the Supreme Council in
Paris in January, 1921, the French put forward a reparation
claim of five and one-half billion pounds and a total German
liability of ten billion pounds. 20 Lloyd George contended
that the "French would not face facts and persisted in
saying that Germany must pay so much in cash without indicating how the payment could be made without ruining French
trade," 21 The Supreme Allied Council therefore announced
the so-called Paris Resolutions of January 29, 1921,

The

Germans did not have to accept the Paris Resolutions as this
action was actually a breach of the promise made at Spa
that reparation would be discussed with Germany at a con. Geneva. 22
f erence in
During the next few months, there occurred a
counter-proposal by Germany which proved unacceptable,
followed by an ultimatum delivered to Germany on March 3,
1921, demanding that Germany unconditionally accept the
19A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Relations,
p. 126.

20Harold Nicolson, Curzon, p.231.
21 Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary,

(London1

22 carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations
Ernest Benn Ltd., 1927), p.57.
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January 29 peace terms,

The German government refused to

accept the terms; thus, the Rhine parts of Duisburg,
Dusseldorf, and Ruhrart were occupied by both Britain and
France on March 8, 1921~ 3 Lloyd George was not in favor of
this occupation, but felt that it was necessary to show a
unified Allied stand to an insincere Germany and,at the
same time, keep some control over Germany,

Lloyd George

said of the whole affair that the French needed to make up
their mind as to whether they wanted the "enjoyment of
trampling on Germany."

Britain was strictly against

''military adventure" and Lloyd George preferred "economic
pressure to military." 24 Even though the sanctions imposed
by the Allies were widely regarded as illegal at the time,
Lloyd George supported the Paris plan of January 29, 1921,
and firmly believed Germany would have to carry out the
terms.
In accordance with Article 233 of the Treaty of
Versailles, the Reparations Commission finally issued its
report on April 27, 1921,

The Commission announced the

total German reparation liability at six billion sixhundred million pounds (the equivalent of thirty-three
billion dollars).

A conference was immediately held in

London April 29-May 5 to determine a plan for Germany to
2 3viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo,
24
Viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo,

p,133,
p.134.

81

meet this obligation and also to consider a new ultimatum
to enforce the terms.

The "London Schedule of Payments"

and the ultimatum arrived in Berlin on May 6, 1921 and was
accepted by the Germans on May 11, 1921, just twenty-four
hours before the expiration on the time limit on the
ultimatum. 25
Since late 1919 the Allies had worked to find an
answer to the reparation question.

The British policy had

proved itself essentially weak, and the British leaders
did not effectively resist the policy of the French.
Earlier, Georges Clemenceau, speaking of French
security, said that "peace is a disposition of forces
supposed to be in equilibrium, in which the moral force of
organized justice is surrounded by strategical precautions
against all possible disturbances." 26 Clemenceau was saying that peace is a condition based on a balance of power
of major nations who have as a goal strategical procedures
designed to preserve that balance.

And Clemenceau was

quite worried that this equilibrium would be disturbed by
a moderate Anglo-French settlement with the Germans.
Throughout the whole conference period, Lloyd
George was sympathetic to the fears of France, but he

2

5carl Bergmann, History of Reparations, p.75.
26
Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of
Victory (New York1 Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p.107.
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opposed the harsh treatment France wished to administer to
Germany.

He later discovered that there was little he

could do to resist France beyond verbal protests against
her policies.

His policy toward Germany was built upon

reconciliation and rehabiliatation and not repression.

He

was deeply concerned with the economic prosperity of Great
Britain and Europe

economic prosperity which depended

on an economically healthy Germany.

Lloyd George therefore

found French tactics distasteful, especially their insistence on "productive guarantees" which meant the occupation
and seizing of German land and property.
Lloyd George's conference diplomacy policy has
been condemned by his critics.

The historian Gordon A.

Craig has attacked Lloyd George for having ignored "foreign
office experts in favor of the advice of private secretaries
such as Philip Kerr.

He presents evidence in support of

Lloyd George"s attitude toward professional diplomats and
their "formal correspondence and carefully drafted notes." 27
Lloyd George believed that "Diplomats were invented simply
to waste time, ... It is simply a waste of time to let
(important matters) be discussed by men who are not authorized to speak for their countries." 28 It was Lloyd George's
2 7Gordon A.Craig, "The British Foreign Office from
Grey to Chamberlain", i:h The DiTlomats 1919-1939, ed. by
Bordon Craig and Felix GilbertPrinceton1 Princeton University Press, 1953), p.~7.
28 Gordon Craig, "Foreign Office•: p. 28.
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way of avoiding the "old diplomacy" of the pre-war era, which
had failed so utterly in preventing war and had caused so
much crisis.

Craig contends that Lloyd George did not know

what he was about, so clearly seen when one looks at the
"paucity of results attained by Lloyd Georgian diplomacy in
the years 1919-1922. " 29 So far as foreign policy was concerned, Lloyd George either pursued his own and the Foreign
Office was obliged either to come into line, once it had
ascertained what his latest schemes might be, or else
endeavor to countermand them at a lower level.

Lloyd George

was convinced that face-to-face confrontations between
heads of state, and lengthy arguments a~ the conference
table, were the only way to get things done.

However, it

seems apparent that there was little anyone could do to
change the harsh attitude France had toward Germany and the
Treaty.

Britain was willing to compromise on virtually all

matters, whereas the French felt that they had done all
their compromising at Paris.
In 1969 Stanley Baldwin's biographers repeated
Gordon Craig's attack on Lloyd George almost word for word,
They took the argument a bit further by putting forth the
argument that no one in Britain was happy with Lloyd George's
policy;

they felt that in Britain there was an "unreason-

29Gordon Craig, "Foreign Office",

pp,28-29.
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And it was not an easy road for Lloyd George.

He had to

decide whether to support the French completely, for that
is what they demanded, or to work for a modification of
their demands, or to modify his own position.

However,

Harold Nicolson, in 1934, stated that Lloyd George's
policies were not amiss.

Nicolson felt that Lloyd George

was "superb" as an originator of policy and that his concepts for peace paralleled traditional concepts.

Nicolson

also believed that Lloyd George worked consistently to maintain the three principles of British foreign policy

- "the

command of the seas, the balance of power in Europe, and
the defense of our imperial frontiers and communications," 31
Nicolson was greatly impressed, as well, with the consistency and moderate tone of Lloyd George's foreign policies.
This, of course, is the basic thesis of this works

that

Lloyd George possessed a consistent and moderate concept of
foreign policy and set himself to realizing it through his
personal leadership.
Conference Diplomacy might have been very productive if France and Germany had been as convinced of the
merit of the conferences as had Britain.

But they were not.

JOKeith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A
Biography (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.106-107.
31Harold Nicolson, Curzon, pp,54-55-
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It appears that the conference only served to heighten
international tensions.

Both Britain and France were set

upon two different and probably uncompromising policies
toward Europe.

France sought to maintain her security

through military pacts.

Britain was opposed to this con-

tinued appeal to force.

Instead, she sought to discourage

armaments and encourage reconciliation of differences
through cooperation and expedition of the economic reconstruction of Europe; therefore, diplomacy by conference
"proved evasive, imprecise, timid, empirical, and unconstructive ... 32

Lloyd George's diplomacy, in addition to

heightening Anglo-French tensions, seemed to encourage
Germany to exploit those differences to her advantage. 33
It seems that Germany did exploit Anglo-French differences
and was pleased about the general direction and conduct
of Lloyd George's diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the Germans

often misinterpreted the seriousness of the rift.

But the

fact remains that a situation was created which permitted
Germany to play one power against the other.
Diplomacy by conference, and the subsequent decline of the Foreign Office, did not spring completely from
Lloyd George in 1919.

Sir Maurice Hankey has written a

32Harold Nicolson, Curzon,

p.187.

33 D.W.Brogan, The Development of Modern France
1870-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), II, pp.558-580.
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well-documented study of this very problem, demonstrating
that, "Mr.Lloyd George has always been an enthusiastic
advocate of the principle of diplomacy by conference."

He

proposed a major Allied conference in the Spring of 1915 to
deal with Balkan problems, and Sir Hankey says that when
Lloyd George became Prime Minister, "an immense impetus was
given to the practice of diplomacy by conference. 034
Lloyd George found support for his basic foreign
policy aims from General Jan Smuts.

Smuts was opposed to

the final draft of the Treaty and had vigorously protested
its terms.

When General Smuts prepared to return to South

Africa in 1919, he addressed an important farewell statement
to England and the world.

He expressed opinions which were

shared by Lloyd George and evident throughout 1919-1922.
Smuts reiterated his belief that Europe would never be
stable until Germany became settled and stable; and Great
Britain would never become presperous until Europe could
become settled once more.

"In our policy of European

settlement, the appeasement of Germany therefore becomes of
cardinal importance."35

His appeal could not have fallen on

more sympathetic ears than Lloyd George's.

Smuts had out-

lined what was to become the basis upon which Lloyd George
34Lord Maruice Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference:
Studies in Public Affairs 1920-191+6 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd.,
19
35w.K.Hancock, Selections From Smuts, IV, #1057
(July 18, 1919), pp.271-272,
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rested his policies:

he assumed those policies would be

implicit in his diplomacy by conference,
Lloyd George was constantly trying to bring
France, Germany and all other concerned parties to the
conference table to work out peaceful, moderate settlements
which would preserve Anglo-French relations and the
Versailles Treaty as well.

But there was a fundamental

difference in policy between France and Britain;

and no

matter how conciliatory Britain wished to be, she could
not agree to all of the French terms,

Chapter 6
THE FINAL MOMENTS
By December, 1921, it became clear that the reparation problem had not been solved,

Earlier, the German

reparation debt had been established by the Reparation
Commission as called for in the Versailles Treaty;

but

Germany's ability to meet her schedule of payments proved
to be shortlived,

On December 14, Germany informed the

Reparation Commission that she would be unable to meet her
payments for January and February 1922.

The value of the

German mark had begun to depreciate at a high
once again, a reparation crisis was at hand.

speed and
So, the

subsequent period, from 1921 to 1924, was a period of frequent Allied conferences dealing with the problems of
enforcing the May, 1921, schedule of payments,

As before,

there was almost constant tension between the French position
and the more moderate British one.
As a result of the German notice of December 14,
1921, an

Anglo-French Conference was held in London from

December 18 to December 22,

It was decided that the repara-

tion matter should be taken before the Supreme Council and
that the whole economic reconstruction of Europe and the
possibility of an Anglo-French defensive pact be considered,
The meeting of the Supreme Council was held in Cannes,
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January 6-13, 1922.

There the British attempted an Anglo-

French reconciliation by offering France a defensive pact. 1
And though the French and British were unable to conclude
a broad defensive pact, it looked as though they might nonetheless make real progress toward the improvement of AngloFrench relations.

Unfortunately, the French Premier,

Aristide Briand, was in trouble in Paris and on January 12,
1922, he was forced to resign.

He was succeeded by Raymond

Poincare, First Chairman of Reparation Commission,as Premier
of France.

With his appointment, virtually all friendly

Anglo-French collaboration in solving the reparation problem was gone.

Poincare rigidly insisted upon a strict

enforcement of the treaty;

"he was a lawyer and he saw the

case in simple legal terms.

Germany was a defaulter on her

obligations, a situation for which the law provided." 2
On the same day that Poincare became Premier, the
Reparation Commission announced that it would grant a
moratorium on Germany's cash reparation payments.

It would

be a limited moratorium with Germany paying thirty-one
million gold marks every ten days pending a final settlement.
Germany was also to prepare a scheme of budget and currency
reform.
1

J. Saxton Mills, The Genoa Conference
Hutchinson, 1922), p.J24.
2

(London:

D.W.Brogan, Development of Modern France, p.573,
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The Genoa meeting of the Supreme Council and the
invited powers of Europe took place from April 10 to May 19,
1922.

It was also a dismal failure.

The signing of the

Rapallo Treaty between.Germany and Russia made Anglo-French
negotiations with the German government even more difficult
than they were.

The Treaty of Rapallo made Poincare more

determined than ever before to enforce the Versailles Treaty
to the letter.3
On August 1, 1922, the British made a sweeping
offer, in the form of the Balfour Note, designed to reduce
both inter-allied debts due to Britain and reparation due
from Germany, if that were necessary to arrive at a peaceful international settlement.

However, the Balfour note

failed also, and it produced no favorable results at all.
At the reparation conference held in London,
August 7-14, 1922, the French sought what they termed
"productive guarantees" to insure German reparation payment.
These "productive guarantees" included the control of
import-export licenses for the Rhineland occupied territory
and collection of customs duties along Germany's western
frontier.

The British opposed almost every one of the

French proposals and in turn submitted guarantee proposals
of their own.

Poincare rejected them almost point for point.

Therefore, this Conference, like so many previous ones,
3n.W.Brogan, Development of Modern France,

p,574,
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ended without reaching an agreement. 4
The British continued to submit moratorium proposals to the Reparation Commission, only to have them
rejected by the French-dominated body.

London made another

attempt at an inter-allied settlement of the reparation problem at a conference in London December 9-11, 1922, but the
British failed to make any progress. 5
Meanwhile, a very important meeting of the Reparation Commission was taking place.

The G~rmans had been

granted earlier in the year a moratorium on cash payments,
but not on deliveries in kind.

As a result of the tremen-

dous inflation of the mark the German government had fallen
behind on her deliveries in kind.

On December 22, 1922,

the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default
on her reparation deliveries.

The British government waited

expectantly for the French action she knew would be taken by
France.

Bonar Law, in a letter to Lord Curzon, said "I

have no hope of the (upcoming) conference of January 2,
unless something unexpected happens." 6 As expected, the
French carried out their plan to occupy the Ruhr against
British protests.
4

The occupation, which began January 11,

CAB 23/30, WC 44, August 10, 1922,

5David Lloyd George, Where Are We Going (New York:
.
George H.Doran Company, 1923), pp,127-130,
6Robert Blake,
The
Life and Times of Andrew Bon
(London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1955, p.48
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1923, proved costly for the French, but it did help to break
German resistance.

And as a result of the Ruhr occupation,

the whole of the German industry collapsed.

Poincare's

policy became unpopular in France as taxes had to be raised
by twenty per cent to cover the cost of the occupation.
Poincare was turned out of office in 1924 and replaced by
Edouard Herriot as Premier with Briand as Foreign Minister.
Thus, the French changed their policy to a more moderate
one and became more willing to negotiate.
At this point, a British and American committee
offered the Dawes Plan for approval,

The Dawes plan pro-

vided for a reorganization of the German Reichsbank under
Allied supervision.

Reparations payments of one billion

gold marks were to be made annually, increasing at the end
of five years to two and one half billion.

Germany was to

receive a foreign loan of eight hundred million gold marks.
The Committee was headed by the American banker Charles G.
Dawes.

The Dawes Plan did not attempt to revise the origi-

nal amount due from Germany.

It was an answer to the repar-

ation problem and a means of helping the economy of Europe
to recover.
In Spetember, 1928,th~. Allies finally agreed to
make a last attempt to determine Germany's reparation liability.

A committee, under the direction of an American

lawyer and President of General Electric, Owen Young, was
created to study the problem.

In June, the Young Committee
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presented its report.

The plan called for annuities ranging

from two billion gold marks to one billion gold marks until
1988.

But the Young Plan had hardly been accepted when the

world-wide depression that began in 1929 dealt a crushing
blow to any hope of collecting reparation from Germany.

On

July 1, 1931, a moratorium on future reparation payments
came into effect for twelve months.

At the Conference of

Lausanne in 1932 the German reparation bill was to be
dropped except for one final payment of three billion marks.
The entire period of reparation conferences, 19191924, proved to be a period of one conference failure after
another.

N~ither side could hope to achieve its goals with-

out the cooperation of the other.

The lengthy negotiation

served only to define and emphasize the irreconcilable
differences between France and Britain.
Lloyd George maintained a continued faith in his
ability to win peace in Europe through use of moderation
and diplomacy by conference.
sames

His objective remained the

disarmament; the economic reconstruction of Europe;

and the return of Germany and the Soviet Union to the world
diplomatic community.

And in the face of the persistent and

uncompromising opposition of France, Lloyd George maintained
his faith that by bringing the French to the conference
table, compromises could be reached.

His policy toward

Europe and his conduct of diplomacy at the conference table
remained consisten~ and moderate throughout 1919-1922.

Thus ended Lloyd George's diplomacy by conf'erence.
Lloyd George had constantly tried to guarantee French
security by offering her several defense pacts, but France
refused.

It seems apparent that it is the French who must

bear the responsibility for the failure of Lloyd George's
program of post-war reconciliation and reconstruction.

It

needs to be added that Lloyd George was not anti-French.
He opposed post-war French policies because he believed
these policies to be wrong.
Throughout 1919-1922 Lloyd George carried the
support of his cabinet with him to the numerous coni'erences
of those years.

Of course not every member of the Cabinet

was fully in accord with him on all matters.

Lloyd George

never acted independently of his Cabinet, although it is
equally apparent that he did on occasion ignore the valuable services of the Foreign Office.

But the normal

channels of diplomacy were too slow for Lloyd George. He
wanted immediate decisions and this could best be done by
meeting his foreign counterparts in person at international
conferences.

It was in diplomacy by coni'erence that Lloyd

George sought to win reconciliation and peace.
But Lloyd George had many critics.

It seems that

much of the coni'usion and myth which has grown up around
Lloyd George's conduct of foreign policy has political
origins.

That is to say that Lloyd George was a politician

and whatever he did had political implications.

Two recent
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publications, whose main subject is British Conservative
politics, are very anti-Lloyd George in their treatment of
both his domestic and foreign policies. 7

In

any discussion

of Stanley Baldwin or J.C.C. Davidson, anti-Lloyd George
sentiment is bound to surface.

But as in the biography of

Baldwin, the substance of Lloyd George's policy toward
France and Germany is submerged in politics,
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, Lloyd
George had established as early as January 1918 his general
guidelines for achieving and maintaining peace in Europe,
Even at this time, his plan was for the same moderate reconciliation and peace that he was still working for in

1922.

His policy remained consistent from 1918-1922.
When Lloyd George resigned in October 1922, George

wrote in his diary, "some day he will be Prime Minister
again. " 8 But he never again held that post. This was his

V

final separation from office,
To the chaotic end of reparations in 1932, the
British and Lloyd George remained faithful to a policy
designed to revise the reparation clauses of the Versailles
Treaty in favor of Germany and to restore economic order to
Europe.

However, British plans were continually hampered

7Robert Rhodes James, ed., Mem ir
vative1 J.C.C.Davidson's Memoirs and Pa
London: Macmillan, 19 9, and Keith Mi
emas, a
8
Harold Nicolson, King George V, p.481,

erwin.

by the French.

Neither France nor Britain would cooperate

in order to achieve a common goal.

Finally it was the French

who reluctantly gave up their policy in favor of the more
moderate British one, but for the latter it was not a joyous victory, for the European economy had collapsed.
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